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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to model determinants 
affecting the magnitude of first-day returns from IPOs on 
the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Our research will cover 
the 1996 – 2004 periods.  
  
 
Methodology: We have chosen a deductive attempt with a quantitative 
procedure through which we can draw general results. 
More specifically, we use multiple regression models to 
attain our purpose. 
 
Theoretical perspectives: IPO literature has generally done a good job in covering 
the theoretical perspective on why first-day returns exist. 
Within this area, Ritter is the foremost authority.  
 
Empirical foundation: The method of predicting first-day returns is derived from 
the assumption that first-day returns are explained as a 
function of company characteristics, stock market cycle 
and how the IPO is conducted. Our empirical foundation 
is built upon 258 firms, of which 124 where identified as 
clean IPOs. From this sample we were able to collect data, 
supplied by FI, in the form of company listing 
prospectuses, on 107 firms. 
 
Conclusions: Although our findings can be deemed successful, we have 
failed to find a model that determines first-day returns. 
This revelation is hardly surprising since doing so is 
virtually impossible. Instead, our findings show, with a 
high degree of certainty, which behavioural characteristics 
can be expected during the first-day of trading, given the 
input variables we have chosen.  
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Abstract 
 
When a company performs an IPO it is valuated by the market for the first time. An 
overpriced IPO will lead to negative first-day returns and thus bad publicity. On the 
other hand, a heavily underpriced IPO is equivalent to leaving money on the table. 
Hence, it is in the best interest of every company considering an IPO to set a fair offer 
price. However, previous studies find that underwriters appear to make systematic 
errors in using historic accounting data when setting the offer prices of IPOs. Further, the 
underpricing and cyclicality phenomenon as well as other trends associated with IPOs are 
of utmost importance to investors and companies considering an IPO. In this paper 
we focus on the relation between the magnitude of first-day returns and a number of 
broad factors, including; accounting information, ownership information, underlying 
IPO motives, the market conditions at the time of the IPO and IPO procedure. Our 
purpose is to model determinants affecting the magnitude of first-day returns, using a 
sample that covers 107 IPOs on the Stockholm stock exchange, between 1996 and 
2004. Although our findings can be deemed successful, we have failed to find a 
model that determines first-day returns. However, we hope our results will contribute 
to shed more light on the factors most important in determining the magnitude of 
first-day returns from IPOs.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Stock exchanges function as a market for companies to raise capital. They are thereby 
essential in channelling savings into productive enterprises that can no longer finance 
further growth without external funds. The first prerequisite for a company to become 
listed on a stock exchange is an Initial Public Offering, hereafter IPO. Empirical 
evidence on IPOs clearly document three distinct patterns, all of which have been 
comprehensively covered in academic literature.1  
 
First, IPOs tend to be underpriced resulting in spectacular first-day returns. 
Underpricing and large first day returns are some of the most well recognized 
characteristics of the new-issue market and there has been extensive research on the 
area. For an example, Ritter finds that the average first day return on the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange was 34.1 percent (1980-1994). The same evidence holds true 
globally with average first day returns ranging from 12.1 percent in Israel (1990-
1994) and 104.1 percent in Malaysia (1980-1998).2 Second, when compared to the 
stock market as a whole or to the performance of industry benchmarks, newly issued 
stocks tend to under-perform in the long-run.3 Third, there is a pronounced cyclicality 
both in the number and size of IPOs and the degree of underpricing. The implication of 
this phenomenon is that companies tend to go public during bull-markets creating huge 
fluctuations, year over year, on the amount of new listings. The number of IPO’s on 
the Stockholm Stock Exchange peaked in 1999 with thirty one companies going 
public, attracting SEK 4.7 Billion to the IT sector alone.4 As we are writing this 
paper, IPOs have once again re-emerged as a “hot” topic following the burst of the 
equity bubble in early 2000, with three IPOs performed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchanges in 2004.  
 
Now that IPOs have come back in vogue again we feel that a renewed interest in 
profitable IPO trading should take place and through this paper we hope to contribute 
to the existing knowledge about IPO valuation. In doing this we have chosen to focus 
on the role of information available prior to the IPO, in relation to first-day returns 
from IPOs on the Stockholm stock exchange between 1996 and 2004. In particular, 
we focus on the relation between the level of first-day returns and a number of broad 
                                                 
1 Ritter. J., “Investment Banking and Securities Issuance” (2003) p.p 254-304 
2 Ibid p. 280-281 
3 Ritter, J., “The long-run performance of initial public offerings” (1991)  p.p 3-27.  
4 Hammar, ”IT-bolag hetast bland nyintroduktionerna” (2000)  
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factors, including; accounting information, ownership information, underlying IPO 
motives, the market conditions at the time of the IPO and IPO procedure.   
 
 
1.2 Presentation of Problem 
 
When a company performs an IPO it is valuated by the market for the first time. For 
that reason, it is in the best interest of every company considering an IPO to set a fair 
offer price. An overpriced IPO will lead to negative first-day returns and thus bad 
publicity. On the other hand, a heavily underpriced IPO is equivalent to leaving 
money on the table. First-day returns can be explained by the difference between the 
offer price of the company’s shares and the markets expectations and valuation 
during the first day of trading. It is up to the underwriters involved to set a fair offer 
price that fully reflects all public information about the company going public. 
However, previous studies find that underwriters appear to make systematic errors in 
using historic accounting data when setting the offer prices of IPOs.5 
 
We are interested in examining whether IPO prices are informative, in the sense that 
they reflect basic firm characteristics and accounting data such as firm age, ownership 
structure and size of revenue. Further, the firms’ motives for going public is also of 
great interest as well as the way in which the IPO is conducted, for an example which 
investment bank that is employed and whether the offering price is fixed or set by an 
auction procedure. If we find significant relationships between these variables and the 
magnitude of first-day returns our results can be used as a proxy for future IPO 
valuations. Previous findings also show that the volume of new issues vary 
dramatically across time. This means that private firms have to take both life-cycle as 
well as market-timing aspects into consideration, when facing the decision of when to 
go public. This as well as other trends related to IPOs are of utmost importance to 
investors as well as companies considering an IPO. Therefore, through our study we 
hope to shed more light on the factors most important in determining the magnitude 
of first-day returns from IPOs.  
 
 
1.3 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this paper is to model determinants affecting the magnitude of first-
day returns from IPOs on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Our research will cover the 
1996 – 2004 periods.  
 
                                                 
5 Melnik, A & Thomas, D  “ Value-Relevance of Accounting Information and the Predictability of IPO 
Underpricing” (2003) p. 2 
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1.4 Target Audience 
 
Our target audience consists of parties’ interested in gaining a greater knowledge 
concerning the characteristics surrounding returns on IPO’s. Our study is especially 
relevant to investment bankers, investors and companies planning to go public. 
 
1.5 Context 
 
As previously discussed, market timing, with regard to capturing cycle peaks, is an 
important factor in a firm’s decision of whether, and when, to go public. This is why 
an understanding of the of the general market sentiments for our chosen time period 
is of great consequence to a study of the IPO process and its first-day returns. The 
frequency of IPOs is generally higher in a bullish market, than in a downward market 
climate.  
 
Figure 6.2. Annual frequency of IPOs plotted against SX All Share Index 
 
Notes. Graph consists of the entire sample of 124 companies. Data on the SX All Share index comes 
from http://finance.yahoo.com/. 
 
 
During the first year in our sample, 1996, 10 IPOs occurred on the A-, O- and OTC-
lists. Prices and trading volumes increased throughout 1996, continuing the bullish 
trend from 1995, resulting in the SX All Share Index gained 38 percent, closing the 
year at a new All Time High.6 The largest IPO during that year was the sale of about 
half of the capital of the truck maker Scania by Investor, with a price tag of SEK 18,8 
billion.7 
 
                                                 
6 Stockholmsbörsen, ”Factbook 1996” (Internet Source). 
7 Ibid 
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The three subsequent years, 1997 to 1999, the SSE continued its advance with a 
record amount of new issues coming to market. The seemingly large number of IPOs 
in 1997 is consistent with the before mentioned incentive to turn to the equity market 
in periods of over-valuation. Stock prices continued to rise during 1997 until October 
8, when Alan Greenspan warned the American markets that they were overvalued.8 
This led to unrest in the markets, which also explains the lower frequency of IPOs in 
1998.   
 
The bullish trend in our sample period came to an abrupt halt in March 2000. Radiant 
growth projections in the beginning of 2000 led consumption to increase to 
unprecedented levels, while inflation remained in check, and The New Economy 
secured a footing in Sweden.9 The advances on SSE culminated in the beginning of 
March, when the valuation of IT companies had reached astronomical heights. At this 
time several firms were lined up and ready for an IPO; the unlucky ones who missed 
timing the booming market, instead being introduced in a market collapsing at 
breakneck speed. 
 
The following two years were a depressing period in SSE’s history. Headlines from 
Swedish business papers sums it up; “Red numbers closed a lousy stock market year” 
and “Only 1931 was worse”. During these two years the number of IPOs declined 
significantly and hit rock-bottom in 2003 with no IPOs at all.  
 
In 2003 the climate shifted and the SX All Share index showed a positive trend. The 
bullish market continued in 2004, largely due to Ericsson’s recovery which accounted 
for 6 % of the total market increase.10 In spite of the stock market revitalization, the 
interest in IPOs continues to be weak. One explanation to this deviance from the 
trend is the series of unsuccessful IPOs that have drawn much attention during the 
last couple of years.   
 
 
1.6 Disposition 
 
Chapter one covers the background of the subject, problems we intend to shed light 
on and the purpose of doing so. Chapter two explains the methodology and clarifies 
the procedure of our study. Chapter three contains theories covering and relating to 
IPOs which we use for our study and conclusions. Chapter four contains the empirical 
study background material. Chapter five consists of our empirical study. Chapter six 
analyzes our findings based on the theories in chapter three. Chapter seven 
                                                 
8 ”Orolig höst på börsen” (Internet Source). 
9 “Optimism och börsfest slutade med baksmälla” 2000. (Internet Source). 
10 Ännu ett bra börsår tack vare Ericsson” (Internet Source). 
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summarizes our findings, what conclusions we could draw and suitable further 
studies. The final two chapters cover our references and supplements to this study. 
 
 
1.7 Deliminations 
 
It would be of great interest to study if the flotation method, that is whether the 
negotiated deal between the IPO-company and the investment bank is based on firm 
commitment or best efforts, has any significant impact on the first day returns. 
However we have only been able to find this data for the years 1996 and 1997 giving 
us an insufficient sample. 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Selection of Scientific Methodology 
 
We have chosen to relate relevant theory to our empirical material through a 
deductive attempt using a quantitative procedure. Employing this approach, we take 
our starting point in scientific theory, through which we seek to explain our empirical 
results, using existing hypotheses. One advantage of using deductive reasoning is that 
we get the data needed, in an effective manner, which we later can compare to 
previous scientific findings and theories.11 Hence, the result is that we can easily 
conclude similarities or deviations between existing empirical findings and our own. 
Critique raised against this methodology focus on the risk of researchers becoming 
affected by existing theories and thereby cherry picking the information considered 
most relevant and completely ignoring deviations or other relevant aspects within the 
subject. However, through our extensive study of existing literature on the subject, 
we feel confident that this study is conducted in an objective manner. In order to find 
an explanation regarding determining factors and first-day return magnitudes, we 
employ regression analysis. Our need to study significance levels of specific relations 
resulted in us using a quantitative procedure.  
 
A complete description of our methodological approach will be presented throughout 
the remainder of this chapter and in Chapter 4. Firstly, we hope that this description 
will facilitate that a replica study, that is a repetition of our method, will produce the 
same results as our study does.12 We believe that a concordant renewal of our study 
would be possible. Secondly, we present a thorough description of our methodology 
so that an evaluation will be practicable. The evaluation means that objections can be 
made to our choice of methodology, but also on their correspondence to our purpose 
and its convincing capacity for the conclusions and interpretations that we have 
made.13 
 
                                                 
11 Jacobsen, D.I. ”Vad, Hur, Varför ? Om metodval i företagsekonomi och andra 
samhällsvetenskapliga ämnen”(2002) p. 43 
12 Backman, J, ”Rapporter och uppsatser” (1998) p.37 
13 ibid, p. 37-38 
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2.2 Company Selection 
 
We use a sample of Swedish IPOs during the time period 1996 to 2004. The time 
period is primarily motivated by our intention to up-date and contribute to previous 
research. Secondly, we believe that the more recent the information is, the more 
accurate it will be in predicting first-day returns of future IPOs. Going back to 1996 
provides us with a sample large enough to perform a statistically credible analysis. 
 
We included newly listed firms on the A-, O- and OTC-lists on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange (SSE). The reason for excluding smaller lists is that trading volumes on 
these lists are low, which will affect the reliability of our findings. We only focus on 
clean IPOs, that is, companies which have not previously been traded on other 
markets, such as Stockholms Börsinformation (SBI), Innovationsmarknaden (IM) and 
Nya Marknaden. Further, we excluded spin-offs and equity carve-outs from our 
sample. By spin-offs we mean subsidiaries that have been transferred to the 
stakeholders as a dividend and then listed. The term equity carve-out refers to the 
partial sale of a subsidiary to external investors. 
 
 
2.3 Data Collection 
 
Our data sample is secondary in its nature. Since we are focusing on many different 
variables we have had to rely on several data sources. Among these one finds the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FI), 
annual reports, prospectuses, the SIX-trust system and senior researchers in the field.  
 
We started our data collection at an early stage of our investigation, mostly to ensure 
that we would not have to change our research objective due to insufficient data. As a 
result, we also gathered data for which we could not find theoretical support to 
include in our study. For instance, we excluded variables such as book-to-market and 
price-earnings ratio (P/e). Our intention was to use these as indicators of the firms’ 
growth potential; however we found it hard to define whether these variables 
measured growth potential or the fact that the firm had received a high price for its 
shares. By this we mean that a high P/e-value might indicate a good market-timing of 
the IPO, instead of high calibre growth potential of the firm.  
 
It became evident to us that it would be very time consuming, and perhaps 
impracticable, to find all the data we needed only using the data bases available at 
Lund University. Purchasing the information from an external source would be much 
too costly. Thus, we started investigating who else had interest in the same type of 
data that we needed for our study.  
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Using records from the Information Surveillance Department of the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange (SSE), we collected information about which IPOs had taken place during 
the chosen time period, first listing date, list, offer size and industry classification.  
 
From Mattias Hamberg, senior lecturer at the Department of Business Administration 
at Göteborg University, we received financial data such as sales revenues, operating 
profits, net profits, and balance sheet information such as size of assets and equity 
stakes from 1996 until 2002. For the remaining IPOs we collected the corresponding 
data from the listing prospectuses.  
 
Panel 2.A An Illustration of Observations and their Sources 
 
 
The post-IPO data, last paid on listing date, was collected from the SIX-TRUST 
system. 
 
Information regarding firm age, motives for listing, ownership structure prior to IPO 
date, procedure and whether there was a shift in ownership in conjunction to listing 
were collected from the prospectuses. Finding all the prospectuses was somewhat of a 
challenge. Knowing that FI regulates what information must be included in the listing 
prospectuses, we enquired if they also file the prospectuses. After some mail, and 
later phone, correspondence we managed to receive scanned copies of the listing 
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prospectuses for our sample. For this information we especially thank Riitta Kallio, 
registrator at FI.    
 
After meeting with Martin Holmén, at the Department of Economics, Uppsala 
University, we received a spreadsheet with data, covering an earlier time period than 
ours, which he had collected for an article. From this spreadsheet we adopted his 
classifications of ownership structure and IPO motives.  
 
2.4 Data Processing and Definitions 
 
Data processing was a straight forward procedure, of converting collected data into 
dummy and logarithmic variables. The exceptions being first-day returns and IPO 
motive, which may need more precise definitions, since they leave room for 
interpretation. First-day returns are measured as the difference between last paid on 
the first day of trading and the offer price, which is then divided by the offer price. 
 
OP
OPLPdRET −=1  
 
 
LP  = Last Price paid on first day of trading 
 
OP  = Offer Price of IPO 
 
dRET1  = First-day return 
 
 
As previously mentioned, we collected data on the motives, for performing an IPO, 
from company prospectuses. We noted one or several motives for each firm based on 
the declaration under the heading “Background and Motives” in the prospectuses. 
Accordingly, we did not weigh in any other indications to the possible motives a firm 
might have for listing. 
 
2.5 Validity 
 
Validity is: 
”…the ability of a measuring instrument to measure what is intended to measure.”14 
 
                                                 
14 Eriksson, LT, & Wiedershelm, PF, ”Att utreda, forska och Rapportera” (2001). 
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Validity has two dimensions, one internal and one external.15 The internal validity 
refers to whether the investigated phenomenon is the same as what was intended to 
investigate. To ensure the internal validity we have prepared what parameters to 
include in our regression analysis carefully. Extensive research has been conducted of 
existing literature and previous studies to facilitate that the selected parameters are 
relevant with respect to our purpose. 
 
The other dimension of validity, the external, has to do with whether one can 
generalize from the accumulated information. A generalization of a phenomenon 
always gives birth, in our minds, to a certain hesitance since it is a simplification of 
something described and can therefore be questioned. We have chosen to work 
quantitatively with an as large sample as possible for our time-series in an attempt to 
improve the external validity. We are, however, well aware of the limitations of 
generalization and what criteria must be fulfilled in order to make generalizations.     
 
 
2.6 Reliability 
 
”A high degree of reliability is achieved if different independent studies of the same 
phenomenon reaches the same or roughly the same results.”16 
 
A high degree of reliability will be attained when sound measurements are conducted 
in addition to careful data processing.17 We have been able to identify similar studies 
and can therefore compare our method and results to these. The reliability of our 
study depends to a large part on the accuracy of the data on which we have done the 
regression analysis. We cannot guarantee that all figures are correct; however we 
have tried to minimize the occurrence of erroneous data by having two independent 
sources for most observations. Thus, we believe that our study has a high level of 
reliability. 
 
 
2.7 Reference Critique 
 
Validity of previous findings relating to characteristics of first-day returns, are subject 
to questioning due to the fact that they, in general, only publish R-squared statistics. 
This implies that their findings may, or may not be, statistically significant.  
 
                                                 
15 Patel, R & Davidsson, B, ”Forskningsmetodikens grunder: att planera, genomföra och rapportera en 
undersökning” (1994) 
16 Holme, I. M & Krohn, S.B ”Forskningsmetodik” (2001), p. 163 
17 ibid 
Millar, Wessel & Winnberg 18
3. Theory 
 
 
3.1 Motives for Going Public 
 
3.1.1 Finance Further Growth 
 
To raise capital in order to finance further growth seems to be the primary reason for 
going public. For example in a manufacturing company the IPO can provide capital 
for product development. When a company needs to raise additional funds there are 
two options, it can choose to either take on debt or sell partial ownership, where the 
latter option results in the company performing an IPO. Many successful companies 
reach a point where the need of capital is so great that they must turn to the public 
stock market in order to finance future growth. Once the Initial Public Offering is 
carried out, the company gets the opportunity of raising more funds through a 
Seasoned Equity Issue. One of the most common reasons to why companies choose 
to go public instead of issuing debt securities is the fact that capital raised through an 
IPO does not have to be repaid. Whereas debt securities such as bonds must be repaid 
with interest, there is no doubt that an IPO has a clear advantage over issuing debt in 
this perspective. Further, if a company finds itself in a situation needing large 
infusions of external capital, public markets may provide a cheaper source of funds 
because of the lack of a liquidity discount that private firm investors would demand. 
18 
 
3.1.2 Exploiting a Window of Opportunity 
 
At some point, stock market investors may be overestimating an industry’s prospects 
which can be used as a window of opportunity by issuing stock at these times. 
According to Ritter the long run underperformance associated with Initial Public 
Offerings is due to the fact that companies take advantage of investor exuberance 
concerning future returns by using these windows of opportunity to issue shares.19 
Stock markets follow cycles driven by investor expectations of future returns. During 
the course of a cycle, great differences in volume exist between peak and trough. 
Companies planning to go public often try to time their IPO so that they become 
listed when investors display optimism regarding future returns. Further, when there 
have been many successful IPOs in a row, the market for IPOs is considered to be 
advantageous and more companies tend to go public using this window of 
                                                 
18 “Initial Public Offerings” (Internet Source). 
19 Ritter. J., “Investment Banking and Securities Issuance” (2003)  p. 278. 
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opportunity to obtain cheap funding. Although variations will exist, year over year, in 
the amount of companies going public, the window of opportunity hypothesis is not 
sufficient in explaining the great divergence in the number of Initial Public Offerings 
over a cycle.20 
 
3.1.3 PR-Value 
 
A common secondary reason for performing an IPO is the gain in PR-value followed 
by an IPO, resulting in increased public recognition, credibility and status. These 
advantages are especially known to be valuable in negotiations, international business 
relations as well as for the credit rating of a company. Increased publicity also attracts 
superior employees.21  
 
 
3.1.4 Additional Motives 
 
By performing an IPO the option of financing acquisitions through share offerings, 
instead of cash, becomes available.22 Further, using the funds to reduce existing debt 
is also a common motive. Moreover, performing an IPO enables a way to free up 
previously tied capital, for existing owners, through the public sale of shares. The 
shares can also be used in an incentive program for the employees and management 
recruitment becomes easier by allowing the company to offer stock or option 
compensation. Finally the shares can be used for other control purposes such as 
keeping the family ownership of a company.23  
 
3.2 Drawbacks 
 
There are also drawbacks associated with IPOs, many of which are related to the fact 
that the ownership structure changes when a firm goes public. For example, current 
owners of the privately held corporation lose corporate control as they sell ownership 
stakes in the company.24 Furthermore, performing an IPO is a very costly process due 
to expenses such as, for an example, intermediary charges. A rule of thumb states that 
the explicit costs of an IPO usually amount to 7 percent of the funds raised.25 
However, the final cost is somewhat higher if one factors in expenses such as 
providing the market with information and increased regulation. Moreover, due to the 
                                                 
20 Ibid p. 278. 
21 Bergström C. & Björk T. Från optionsprissättning till konkurslagstiftning (1997) p. 32-36. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Initial Public Offerings” (Internet Source). 
24 Ritter. J., “Investment Banking and Securities Issuance” (2003)  p. 277. 
25 Bodie. Z., Kane. A. & Marcus. A., “Investments” (2005) p. 69. 
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new owners' demand for dividends and strong returns, decisions not in line with the 
original owners' long run preferences may have to be taken. Increased publicity can 
sometimes be harmful to the company, for example in case of a crisis situation such 
as a corporate scandal or a weak annual result. Furthermore, going public results in 
increased information sharing requirements.26 Finally, the existence of underpricing 
is a waste of current owners' capital. The implication obviously is that companies 
have to weigh costs and benefits very carefully against each other, before engaging in 
an IPO.  
 
 
3.3 The IPO Process 
 
 
3.3.1 The Regulation of IPOs 
 
Initially a meeting is arranged between the representatives for the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange and the company going public. The IPO process, which takes 
approximately three to six months, is discussed and an inspector is appointed to carry 
out an investigation. The purpose of the investigation is to examine whether the firm 
fulfils necessary prerequisites. The firm’s liquidity, solidity and profitability together 
Corporate Governance issues are examined in order for the Stock Exchange 
Committee to be able to decide whether the company is ready to go public, or not. In 
the mean time, the company in cooperation with a financial intermediary compiles an 
IPO-prospectus and necessary preparations are made before the IPO can be approved. 
A registration statement must be published containing accounting information, 
information what the capital will be used for, the company’s history and its present as 
well as previous situation. The prospectus contains similar information but is 
designed to market the company and its IPO. Both the registration statement and the 
prospectus are thoroughly examined by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
(FI) in order to discover incorrect or misleading information. If such information is 
found the IPO is either completely stopped or postponed.27 
 
3.3.2 List Requirements 
 
The Stockholm Stock Exchange consists of two main indices, the A and O-list. The 
requirements are different depending on which list a company wants to get listed on. 
The A-list consists of the largest companies who fulfil the highest requirements. 
Furthermore, the A-list is divided into one list of most traded stocks and one list for 
other stocks. The most traded list consists of some of Sweden’s largest companies 
                                                 
26 “Corporate Governance” (Internet Source). 
27 Holmén M, ”Motiv för marknadsintroduktion -underprissättning av IPOs” (Internet Source). 
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like Pharmacia, Astra Zeneca, Volvo, Investor, Electrolux, Ericsson, ABB and 
Holmen.  The O-list consists of small and average sized companies listed on a most 
traded stock list (Attract 40) and one for other stocks. 28 
 
The main requirements for the A-list are as follows;  
 
The Corporation must: 
 
• Have a market value of at least 300 million SEK 
• Have been active for at least three years and shall be able to present 
accounting information for these years 
• Fulfill the Stock Exchange Corporate Governance requirements concerning 
the management and composition of the board of directors, et.c. Further, the 
company must have capacity to provide sufficient stock market information 
• Have at least 2000 shareholders, that own at least 25 percent the shares 
• Publish a prospectus 
 
 
The main O-list requirements are essentially identical to the A-list, with the exception 
that listed companies requires a minimum of 500 shareholders, holding at least 10 
percent of the shares and votes.29 
 
3.3.3 Financial Intermediaries 
 
Once the company going public has decided the amount of capital needed in order to, 
for example finance its further growth, it has to decide which financial intermediary it 
wishes to employ. Investment Banks are such financial intermediaries that, among 
other things, provide the services of pricing, market and selling new securities to the 
public in what is called the primary market. In a competitive bid procedure the 
company offer a block of its shares to interested investment banks. However this 
method is only possible for large, well established companies since investment banks 
do not want to spend money on valuing a small company if they not are sure of 
getting the deal. A more common procedure is a negotiated deal for which there are 
two basic methods of issuing securities for cash; Firm commitment and Best efforts.30 
 
                                                 
28 Svenska Fondhandlareföreningen ”Handla med aktier” (Internet Source)   
29 Stockholmsbörsen ”Börsnotering och noteringskrav” (Internet Source) 
30 Holmén M, ”Motiv för marknadsintroduktion -underprissättning av IPOs” (Internet Source). 
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3.3.4 Firm Commitment 
 
Under this method, the issuing firm sells its securities to investment banks at a price 
less than the offering price since the underwriters involved accepts the risk of not 
being able to resell them to the primary market. In order to minimize this risk, 
investment banks combine to form an underwriting syndicate. The syndicate typically 
announces the prospective sale by advertisements in news papers and financial press. 
The difference between the price at which the securities are sold to the underwriters 
and the offering price is called a spread and works as the underwriters’ basic 
compensation.31  
 
3.3.5 Best Efforts 
 
In a best efforts offering the investment banks does not purchase a company’s shares. 
Instead, investment bankers act as intermediaries between the firm and the public, 
receiving a commission for each share sold. Under this procedure the investment 
bank does not bear the risk of being unable to resell the securities at the offering price 
but is legally bound to use its best efforts to sell the securities at the agreed-upon 
offering price. Hence, the company is not guaranteed that it actually will receive the 
capital needed.32 In case of a scenario in which the issue cannot be sold at the 
offering price it is usually withdrawn.33 According to a study by Jay Ritter, best-
efforts offerings are generally used for small IPOs, whereas firm-commitment 
offerings are used for large IPOs.34 
 
3.4 Setting The Offer Price 
 
Since future cash flows are hard to predict, especially for young firms, the process of 
estimating the offer price is a tedious task. Hence, underwriters normally use many 
different models to compute a fair price of the issued shares. Comparable firm 
multiples, Discounted Cash Flow-models (DCF) and industry analysis are used 
together with underwriters’ experiences from previous IPOs and the information 
provided through the prospectus.35   
 
 
                                                 
31 Ross. S., Westerfield. R. & Jaffe. J., “Corporate Finance” (2005) p. 544 
32 Holmén M, ”Motiv för marknadsintroduktion -underprissättning av IPOs” (Internet Source). 
33 Ross. S., Westerfield. R. & Jaffe. J., “Corporate Finance” (2005) p. 545 
34 J. Ritter, “The Costs of Going Public,” (1987) p.p 269-281. 
35 E. Pettersson, C. Svetlik:  ”Att betala rätt pris på aktier vid en börsintroduktion –betydelsen av 
immaterialla tillgångar”, (2003). 
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3.4.1 Comparable Firm Multiples  
 
A preliminary price can be computed by using comparable firm multiples. For 
example, if a company going public has earnings of 2 million and listed firms with 
similar characteristics sell at a price-to-earnings multiple of 20, then the firm going 
public should be valued at 40 million. Rather than using historical accounting 
numbers, underwriters, in practice, use forecasts of current or next year’s numbers 
when computing multiples. This focus has the benefit of making company profits 
higher, resulting in larger IPO revenues. Different multiples are used depending on 
industry. Some common multiples used include price-to-earnings, enterprise value-to-
sales, enterprise value-to-EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation 
and amortization) in addition to industry-specific multiples.36  
 
3.4.2 The Discounted Cash Flow Model 
 
Just as in the case of using comparable firm multiples, the DCF-model strives to 
determine a company’s value. However, a DCF-model aims to do this according to 
the company’s estimated future cash flows. Forecasted free cash flows (operating 
profit + depreciation + amortization of goodwill – capital expenditures – cash taxes – 
change in working capital) are discounted to a present value using the company’s 
weighted average costs of capital. Developing a DCF-model demands a lot more 
work than most other valuation models but in return for the effort, investors get a 
good picture of the key drivers of share value. In using DCF as a model of valuation, 
investors do not only have to take micro economic variables but also a number of 
macro economic variables into account.37  
 
3.4.3 Book Building 
 
Perhaps the most useful information concerning at what price investment banks can 
market new securities, is collected from the investing community. After having 
attracted potential large investors and provided them with information about the IPO, 
investment bankers examine their interest of purchasing shares. This process is called 
book building and gathers valuable information about the price since the aggregated 
demand from the book building works as an indicator of the market’s valuation of the 
company. Large institutional investors usually possess useful insights about the 
demand for the security as well as the prospects of the company and the industry it is 
operating within. Hence, based on the important feedback from the investing 
                                                 
36 J. Ritter “Investment Banking and Securities Issuance” (2003) p. 278. 
37 B. McClure “Taking Stock of Discounted Cash Flow” (Internet Source). 
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community it is not unusual that investment banks revise their initial offering price 
estimates as well as the number of shares offered.38  
 
3.4.4 Fixed Price vs. Offer by tender 
 
Finally, the investment banks either determine a fixed price at which investors can 
sign up for the issue or the price is set through an auction like procedure ending a 
couple of days before the date of the IPO. Setting the price through the latter 
alternative is known to minimize the risk of overpricing (or extreme underpricing) 
especially if the final price is set as close to the date of the IPO as possible. The 
longer the price is set prior to the IPO the harder it gets, not to say impossible, to take 
all possible events affecting the price into consideration. Previous findings show that 
in order to minimize the risk of overpricing, the fixed pricing method contributes to 
underpricing.39 
 
 
3.5 Underpricing 
 
One major determinant of the magnitude of first day returns from IPOs is the 
existence and extent of overpricing, or underpricing, where the latter phenomenon is 
by far the most common. The extent of underpricing is defined as the rise in the stock 
price during the first day of trade i.e. the difference between the offer price and the 
closing price. 40 Investors seem to be more willing to speculate and pay more if there 
recently has been underpriced IPOs and the extent of underpricing vary over time. 
 
Determining the correct offering price is the most difficult task facing the investment 
bank. If an issue price is set too high, the IPO may fail to attract investors and 
involved investment banks would lose money since they carry the price risk. On the 
other hand, should the price be set too low, existing shareholders would experience 
an opportunity loss and the investment banks involved could have their reputation 
damaged. Further, the higher prestige the investment bank employed in an IPO 
enjoys, the lower the magnitude of underpricing, or first-day returns, should be, since 
the bank’s renown would guarantee the soundness of the IPO. In addition, investment 
banks have the responsibility of pricing fairly. However, several studies indicate that 
new equity issues typically are underpriced. For an example, Ritter examined 
approximately 6, 974 IPOs between the years of 1975 -2000 in the United States 
where he found an average increase in price of 17.8 percent in the first day of trading 
                                                 
38 Bodie. Z., Kane. A. & Marcus. A., “Investments”, (2005) p. 68 
39 Holmén M, ”Motiv för marknadsintroduktion -underprissättning av IPOs” (Internet Source). 
40 Ibid. 
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following issuance.41 In Sweden, the corresponding result is 30 percent which is 
bewildering considering the fact that on every SEK 1 million a company issues, it 
gives away SEK 300’000.42 The question why this is made systematically has been 
discussed in many previous studies with a series of explanations as a result. For an 
example underpricing is more usual in smaller IPOs with young firms with uncertain 
future prospects. The increased uncertainty associated with these kinds of companies 
results in a higher risk. Hence, risk-averse investors can be attracted only if 
underpricing exists. There are several other possible explanations to underpricing 
even thou there is no unity among researchers as to which explanation is correct. 
Most likely, there is no single true explanation to the phenomenon; instead the cause 
differs from case to case. However, there are a few hypotheses and previous studies 
approaching the problem.  
 
 
3.6 Underpricing Hypotheses 
 
3.6.1 The Winner’s Curse Hypothesis 
 
Kevin Rock published the Winners Curse Hypothesis in the Journal of Financial 
Economics (1986).43 Rock divided the investors who subscribed to the new issues as 
informed and uninformed, where asymmetrical information exists between the two 
groups. During IPOs, set amounts of shares are made available to the public. Should 
demand for shares be greater than the supply, the issue becomes oversubscribed. 
Investors will during these situations not be able to receive and the underwriters will 
be forced to allocate the shares. Although previous studies show that most IPOs have 
positive first day returns, a significant faction experience a negative first day return.  
 
Therefore, an uninformed investor who subscribes to all new issues may find that he 
is allotted few shares in IPOs when competing with informed investors while he is 
allotted the full amount in IPOs where informed investors show less interest. IPOs 
where informed investors tend to show less interest tend to be the issues that have a 
higher probability of negative first day returns. Thus, the uninformed investor who 
“wins” by being allotted the full amount of shares actually loses out due to the 
negative first day returns. 
 
The Winner’s Curse hypothesis focuses on the asymmetrical information between 
investors with the result of well informed investors knowing the fair value of the 
company while investors who are less informed do not. The situation results in the 
                                                 
41 Ross. S., Westerfield. R. & Jaffe. J., “Corporate Finance” (2005) p. 547 
42 Holmén M, ”Motiv för marknadsintroduktion -underprissättning av IPOs” (Internet Source). 
43 Rock. K., ”Why New Issues Are Underpriced” (1986) pp. 187-212 
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fact that there will be a great demand for underpriced IPOs especially among well 
informed investors while there for overpriced IPOs only will be a demand among 
investors carrying less or incorrect information. If this systematically would be the 
case, eventually all less informed investors meeting the Winner’s curse would leave 
the primary market leading to fewer potential IPO investors which in turn would 
complicate future IPOs. In order to avoid this situation, IPOs are deliberately 
underpriced on average.44 
 
3.6.2 The Costly Information Acquisition Hypothesis 
 
According to The Costly Information Acquisition Hypothesis, investment banks can 
underprice issues to persuade investors to reveal information during the offer period. 
The theory suggests that the underwriters do underprice the preliminary book 
building price so that the institutional investors will get interested of the IPO. Their 
valuation of the company then facilitates the setting of the final price which however 
can not be too far from the preliminary book building price. Investors have no reason 
to disclose positive information about the company until the issue is sold. A study 
conducted by Hanley (1993) shows that the relation of the final offer price to the 
range of anticipated offer prices disclosed in the preliminary prospectus is a good 
predictor of initial returns.45 Issues that have final offer prices which exceed the 
limits of the offer range have greater underpricing than all other initial public 
offerings and are also more likely to increase the number of shares issued.46 
 
3.6.3 The Cascade Hypothesis 
 
The Cascade Hypothesis assumes that potential investors consider not only their own 
information, but also the amount of interest shown by other investors. Even if the 
investor has positive information about the company, he may decide to not invest due 
to lack of interest from other investors. In order to counteract this behaviour, 
investment banks deliberately underprice the issue in order to attract a cascade of 
investors willing to by the share no matter what information they have regarding the 
company. 
 
                                                 
44 Holmén M, ”Motiv för marknadsintroduktion -underprissättning av IPOs” (Internet Source). 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid 
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3.6.4 The Investment Banker’s Monopsony Power Hypothesis 
 
The Investment Banker’s Monopsony Power Hypothesis states that asymmetric 
information exists between the investment bank and the company going public.47 The 
investment bank uses its superior knowledge of the financial markets to underprice 
the security in order to spend less time marketing the issue since a lower price will 
ensure that investors flock to the issue. Although the hypothesis may be somewhat 
correct, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) found that investment banks underprice 
themselves as much as any other IPO of the same size.48  
 
 
3.6.5 The Signalling Hypothesis 
 
The Signalling Hypothesis was published in the Journal of Financial Economics by 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989). Underpriced IPOs give positive signals to investors 
enabling the company and insiders to take out higher prices during future issues. The 
hypothesis assumes that insiders have access to information regarding the companies’ 
true worth. The company employs a dynamic strategy where the IPO is followed by a 
Seasoned Equity Issue.49 Only companies that are sure of a steady growth can afford 
employing this method.50 
 
3.6.6 The Wealth Redistribution Hypothesis 
 
This hypothesis states that underpricing could be deliberate if the primary purpose of 
the IPO is not to raise capital. This type of situation can arise when a government 
chooses to privatize a state industry. The government deliberately underprices the 
issue hoping to gain trust among its subjects. Empirical evidence from England and 
Japan has shown that these types of issues have displayed greater underpricing.51 
 
 
                                                 
47 Baron, D, “A model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for 
new issues” (1982) pp. 955-976. 
48 Ibbotson R.G & Ritter J.R, “Initial Public Offerings” (1995) pp. 993-1016. 
49 Garfinkel, J. IPO Underpricing, Insider Selling and Subsequent Equity Offerings: Is Underpricing a 
Signal of Quality, (1993) pp. 74-83. 
50 Holmén M, ”Motiv för marknadsintroduktion -underprissättning av IPOs” (Internet Source). 
51 Ibbotson R.G & Ritter J.R, “Initial Public Offerings” (1995) pp. 993-1016. 
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3.6.7 The Stabilization Hypothesis 
 
Ruud claims that first day returns are overestimated due to investment bank buying, 
after the IPO, intended to stabilize the issue.52 IPO deals usually contain an option to 
sell more shares than initially negotiated. Thereby, investment banks sell a greater 
number of shares to investors, only to repurchase them during the first trading day. 
No direct evidence supports Ruud’s claim that first day returns are close to zero after 
discounting investment bank stabilization. 
 
 
3.6.8 The Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis 
 
The Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis states that companies planning to go public 
deliberately underprice their issue in order to create demand, liquidity and owner 
dispersion making takeovers more difficult.53 
 
3.6.9 The Divergence of Opinion Hypothesis 
 
Investors who purchase IPO issues are, according to Miller, the most optimistic.54 
When uncertainties arise concerning the valuation of an IPO, optimistic investors will 
value the company higher than pessimistic ones. Once investors receive more and 
better information about the company, differences in valuation will decrease and the 
share price will decline. Thus, The Divergence of Opinion Hypotesis implies that 
IPOs under perform equivalent companies over time and that investors periodically 
have unreasonable expectations concerning a company’s future earnings potential. 
 
3.6.10 The Impresario Hypothesis 
 
Shiller (1990) implies that the market for Initial Public Offerings is affected by trends 
and that investment banks underprice issues in order to generate an over-subscription 
of companies who are less attractive.55 According to Schiller’s hypotesis, the size of a 
company’s first day return is negatively correlated with the company’s long term 
performance. Thus, companies with large first day returns are usually the companies 
who tend to exhibit the greatest market under-performance. 
                                                 
52 Ruud, J.S., “Underwriter Price Support and the IPO Underpricing Puzzle”, (1993) pp. 135-151. 
53 Ibbotson R.G & Ritter J.R, “Initial Public Offerings” (1995) pp. 993-1016. 
54 Ibbotson R.G & Ritter J.R, “Initial Public Offerings” (1995) pp. 993-1016. 
55 Shiller, R.J “Speculative Prices and Popular Models”( 1990) pp. 55-65. 
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3.6.11 Window Dressing 
 
One trend associated with IPOs is that companies tend to go public when they are as 
most profitable i.e the companies’ profitability reaches its highest level close to the 
IPO and then starts to fall. This pattern may be a result of the fact that some 
companies manipulate the result in their financial statements in order to attract 
investors. The method is called window dressing and investors seem to expect the 
same profitability after the IPO which in turn also increases the magnitude of the 
underprice. 
 
 
3.6.12 The Cost of Overpricing  
 
Both the company going public and the underwriter have strong incentives not to 
overprice the IPO regardless if the agreement is based on best efforts or firm 
commitment. An overpriced IPO means bad publicity both for the company and the 
investment bank. Thus, in order to simply avoid overpricing the company and the 
underwriter agree to underprice the IPO. This would also be in line with the publicity 
motive for performing an IPO.56 
 
3.6.13 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis was developed during the 1960s by Eugene Fama. 
Fama meant that liquid markets, with many investors, leads to assets being priced 
correctly.57 
 
“An ‘efficient’ market is defined as a market where there a large number of rational, 
profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict future market 
values of individual securities, and where important information is almost freely 
available to all participants. In an efficient market, competition among the many 
intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices 
of individual securities already reflect the effects of information based both on the 
events which have already occurred and an events which, as of now, the market 
expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an efficient market at any point 
in time the actual price of security will be a good measure of its intrinsic value.” 58 
                                                 
56 Holmén M, ”Motiv för marknadsintroduktion -underprissättning av IPOs” (Internet Source). 
57 Haugen. R., “Modern Investment Theory”, (2001) Ch 23. 
57 Fama, E.F, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices (1965) p.4. 
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The Efficient Market Hypothesis effectively states that the possibility to profit by 
predicting future stock prices is practically impossible and that all changes in stock 
prices are due to new information. 
 
For the above to hold true, the market must be efficient. The market is efficient when 
prices respond to new information. Therefore, market prices continuously reflect all 
relevant information and there is no need to believe that the price today is too high or 
too low. Thus, market prices change before investors have a chance to take advantage 
of new information. Efficient markets are created when investors, through 
competition, try to profit from new information. Competition between investors 
assures that the possibilities decrease of making arbitrage profits.  
 
The implication of The Efficient Market Hypothesis can be summarized as; securities 
continuously reflect all relevant information where the price acts as the bearer of 
information. Arbitrage profits are virtually eliminated as a result of securities being 
correctly priced on an efficient market. 
 
3.7 Previous Studies 
 
3.7.1 Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time? 
 
Ritter and Loughran found that in the 1980s, the average first-day return from IPOs 
was 7%. The average first-day return doubled to almost 15% during 1990-1998, 
before jumping to 65% during the internet bubble years of 1999-2000 and then 
reverting to 12% during 2001-2003. They attribute much of the higher underpricing 
during the bubble period to a changing issuer objective function. They argue that in 
the later periods there was less focus on maximizing IPO proceeds due to an 
increased emphasis on research coverage. Furthermore, allocations of hot IPOs to the 
personal brokerage accounts of issuing firm executives created an incentive to seek 
rather than avoid underwriters with a reputation for severe underpricing.59 
 
3.7.2 Why Don't Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on the 
Table in IPOs? 
 
Ritter and Loughran feel that one of the puzzles regarding IPOs is that issuers rarely 
get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table, defined as the 
number of shares sold times the difference between the first-day closing market price 
                                                 
59 Ritter. J. & Loughran. T., “Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?” (2004) pp. 5-37 
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and the offer price. The average IPO leaves millions on the table. This number is 
approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a 
substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm. They present a prospect theory model that 
focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes. Their 
reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern: much more 
money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls. This 
results in an explanation of hot issue markets.60 
 
3.7.3 Valuation of Accounting Data 
 
During the years, there has been an extensive research on the value relevance of 
accounting information for publicly traded stocks. However, there are only a few 
papers that have examined the relevance of accounting information for firms going 
public. 
 
Klein (1996) examines the relation between the price per share (at the offer date and 
at the end of the first day of trading) and various variables for a sample of 193 IPOs 
from the years1980-1991. She finds that the price per share is positively related to 
pre-IPO earnings per share and pre-IPO book value of equity per share.61  
 
Kim and Ritter (1999), investigate the relation between firm-level price earnings 
P/e ratios and the industry-median P/e ratios for a sample of 190 IPOs completed in 
the years 1992-1993. They find that firm-level and industry-level P/e ratios are 
positively related. However, the adjusted R2 of their regression is only five percent. 
Instead, their explanatory level of their model increases when they use forecast 
earnings for the next year instead of pre-IPO historical earnings. Thus, one of their 
conclusions is that industry comparables based on historical accounting information 
are of limited value for understanding IPO pricing.62 
 
However, Beatty, Riffe, and Thompson (2000) question this conclusion regarding 
the low relevance of historical accounting information in the pricing of IPOs based on 
their research using a sample of 2,577 IPOs with positive pre-IPO income as well as 
positive book value of equity between the years of 1987-1998. They find that the 
explanatory level of earnings, book value, and revenues for offer value is about 14 
percent.63 
 
                                                 
60 Ritter. J. & Loughran. T., ” Why Don't Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on the Table in 
IPOs?” (2002) pp. 413-443. 
61 Klein. A.,“Can Investors Use the Prospectus to Price Initial Public Offerings?” (1996) pp. 23-40. 
62 Kim, M. & J. Ritter, ”Valuing IPOs” (1999), pp. 409-437. 
63 Beatty, R., S. Riffe and R. Thompson, “IPO Pricing with Accounting Information (2000). 
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Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003) compare the offer price to sales, and offer 
price to earnings of a sample of 2,288 IPOs between the years of 1980-1997 and find 
that IPOs tend to be overvalued on average. This result is very interesting considering 
the fact that many previous studies suggest that IPOs are underpriced on average. In 
addition, they find that overvalued IPOs have lower profitability, higher accruals, and 
higher analyst growth forecasts.64 
 
 
3.7.4 Value-Relevance of Accounting Information and the 
Predictability of IPO Underpricing 
 
Melnik and Thomas (2003) examine the factors associated with the initial returns 
recorded for a sample of NASDAQ IPOs in 2000. They study the relationship 
between the level of underpricing, accounting data and other variables which are in 
the public domain at the time of the IPO. They find evidence for accounting data 
being significantly related to levels of first day returns since underwriters appear to 
make systematic errors by using multiples of historic financial data when setting IPO 
offer prices. These errors result in the failure of reflecting accounting data in the offer 
price. Further, they document that underwriter’s have significant more negative 
perceptions of financial risk than those of market participants while their perceptions 
of the value-relevance of profitability measures appear to be conservative. For 
smaller firms, underwriters tend to overstate the importance of revenues in setting 
their offer prices while IPOs with large revenues are more accurately priced. Larger 
firms proxied by accounting revenues are also more accurately priced and record 
lower levels of first day returns.  By including other factors such as the type of 
industry, existing market trends and underwriters reputation, their results are robust.65 
 
They find a positive relation between first day returns and market conditions, 
recording higher positive returns in the first day when the broad NASDAQ market is 
bullish. Further, if an issue is subject to an upward price-revision prior to the IPO it is 
more likely to exhibit positive first day returns. This finding suggests that such a 
revision constitute only a partial adjustment and is in accord with the conjecture of 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) who argue that potential investors only will disclose 
indications of their subjective valuation if the offer price is only partially adjusted.66 
 
                                                 
64 Purnanandam, A.K. and B. Swaminathan, Are IPOs Really Underpriced? (2003). 
65 Melnik, A & Thomas, D “Value-Relevance of Accounting Information and the Predictability of IPO 
Underpricing” (2003). 
66 Benveniste, L. & P. Spindt, “How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer 
Price and Allocation of New Issues” (1989) pp. 343-361. 
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In line with Baron’s (1982) findings, Melnik and Thomas document that the 
underpricing is positively related to the prestige of the investment bank.67 Finally, 
they do not find any evidence of a relation between underpricing and agency 
problems proxied by the proportion of equity retained. The implication is that any 
agency considerations appear to have been fully reflected in the setting of the offer 
price. 
 
3.7.5 Predicting First-Day Pops 
 
Using a sample of 853 IPOs issued on NASDAQ between March 1, 1999 and 
December 14, 2000 Irv DeGraw (2001) studies the relationship between the actual 
offering price and the preliminary range as it reflects the degree of pre-IPO demand 
for the offering. If the range is increased, and/or the actual offering price exceeds the 
range, pre-offering demand is assumed to be strong and the first-day gains are higher 
than average. Should the range be decreased or if the actual offer price is lower than 
the range, pre-offering demand is assumed to be weak and first-day returns are 
expected to be modest. He finds considerable first-day differences as offering prices 
exceeding the preliminary range averaged 119.3 percent in first day returns while 
those in the preliminary range averaged 28.1 percent. Those issued under range 
averaged 11.5 percent first-day gains. Thus, the implication is that the percent change 
in offer price is a strong predictor of first-day returns.68 
 
 
 
3.7.6 Determinants Of IPO Valuation 
 
In this paper from Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Sanjai Bhagat 
and Srinivasan Rangan examine the valuation of financial variables, growth 
opportunities, insider retention and investment banker prestige for a sample of 1,655 
IPOs from three time-periods: 1986-1990, January 1997 through March 2000 
(designated as the boom period), and April 2000 through December 2001 (designated 
as the crash period).  
 
They control for IPO fundamentals (such as, income, sales, book equity, growth 
opportunities, insider retention, and investment banker prestige) and allow for 
different valuation of these fundamentals across different time-periods. They find that 
average valuations of IPOs in the recent boom and crash periods were not statistically 
different from those of the late 1980s. They also document some shifts in the 
valuation of fundamentals across time-periods. Further, income of IPO firms is 
                                                 
67 Baron, D. “A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and 
Distribution Services for New Issues” (1982) pp. 955-976. 
68 DeGraw I,“Predicting first-day pops” On Wall Street, (2001). 
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weighted more when valuing IPOs in the boom period compared to the late eighties 
and with respect to inter-industry differences they find that tech firms are valued less 
than non tech firms after controlling for IPO fundamentals. Internet IPOs where not 
valued any differently than non-internet IPOs. Finally, they find that income and 
insider retention are valued more for tech firms. For internet firms, insider retention is 
valued more, but investment banker prestige is valued less.69 
 
3.7.7 Corporate Ownership Structure and IPO Valuation 
 
Downes & Heinkel (1982) 70, Ritter (1984)71, and Feltham, Hughes, and Simunic 
(1991)72, among others, provide evidence on a positive relation between IPO 
valuation and ownership retention.  
 
Leland and Pyle (1977) propose a valuation model in which the current value of the 
firm is positively related to the percentage of equity retained by entrepreneur taking 
the firm public. They base their signalling model on the assumption that the 
entrepreneur knows more about the expected cash flows of the company than do 
potential investors. Further, by retaining shares in the firm the entrepreneur foregoes 
the benefits of diversifying his personal portfolio which can be very costly. Hence, 
the entrepreneur will retain shares in the IPO, only if he is holding inside information 
that gives him reasons to believe that expected cash flows are likely to be high. Thus, 
the implication of the signalling model is that a high proportion of equity ownership 
by pre-IPO shareholders communicates a reliable signal of their expectations about 
the company’s prospects to the underwriter as well as to potential investors, leading 
to higher IPO values.73  
 
The moral hazard theory provides an alternative explanation for this positive relation. 
Since stock ownership aligns managerial incentives with those of shareholders, thus, 
the higher the proportion of ownership by managers the harder they will work 
resulting in higher cash flows. New investors in the IPO anticipate this and therefore, 
companies with a higher proportion of manager ownership are valued higher than 
companies with a lower proportion of manager ownership. In addition Ofek and 
Richardson (2001) explain the positive relation between IPO values and post-IPO 
                                                 
 
69 Bhagat S, Rangan S, “Determinants Of IPO Valuation” (2004) p. 35-36. 
70 Downes D. & R. Heinkel “Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues” (1982) pp. 1-10. 
71 Ritter, J. “Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues: A Comment,” (1984) pp.1231-
1237. 
72 Feltham, G., J. Hughes, and D. Simunic, “Empirical Assessment of the Impact of Auditor Quality on 
the Valuation of New Issues,” (1991) pp. 375-399. 
73 Leland, H. & D. Pyle, “Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial 
Intermediation,” (1977)  pp.371-387. 
Millar, Wessel & Winnberg 35
retention in a theory based on the assumption of a downward-sloping demand curve 
for shares. Under this assumption, the shares become a scarce commodity as a higher 
retention level means fewer shares available for trading, resulting in a price 
increase.74 
 
 
3.7.8 A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public Offerings 
 
A recent study, covering the Swedish stock market Holmén and Högfeldt (2004) 
investigates ownership structure and control aspects for IPOs. They use a sample of 
233 IPOs between 1979 and mid-1997 and follow each firm three years previous to 
the IPO and five years after. An interesting finding in their study, is that family-
controlled firms trade at a discount due to misallocation of control rights to heirs who 
is expected to make inefficient decisions.75 
 
 
3.7.9 Internet IPO Valuation Studies 
 
Bartov, Mohanram, and Seethamraju (2002), focus on the valuation of 98 internet 
IPOs and 98 offer-date and size-matched non-internet IPOs that were completed 
during 1996-1999. Summarized, they find that internet and non-internet IPOs differ 
in terms of the impact of financial statement variables on IPO prices. For internet 
companies, they find that cash flow, sales and sales growth are significantly related to 
offer prices. The result should be seen in contrast to the fact they also find that 
earnings, book value of equity and R&D do not bear significant relation to offer 
prices. Further, by studying first-day closing prices they also find that investors do 
not value the financial statement variables reported by internet firms with exception 
of sales growth and R&D per share. For non-internet IPOs they find that offer prices 
are positively related to earnings, cash flow and sales but no significant relation 
between first-day closing prices is found for any of the financial variables.76  
 
                                                 
74 Ofek, E. & M. Richardson, “The IPO Lockup Period: Implications for Market Efficiency 
and Downward Sloping Demand Curves,” (2001). 
 
75 Holmén M & Högfeldt P, “A law and finance analysis of initial public offerings” (2003). 
76 Bartov, E., P. Mohanram, and C. Seethamraju “Valuation of Internet Stocks – An IPO 
Perspective,” (2002) pp. 321-346. 
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4 The Multiple Regression Model 
 
 
4.1 The Assumptions of the Model 
 
In the econometric model, assumptions about the probability distribution of the 
random errors, te , need to be made.
77 
 
1) 0][ =Ε te . Each random error has a probability distribution with zero 
mean. Some errors will be positive, some will be negative; over a large 
number of observations they will average out to zero. With this 
assumption we assert that the average of omitted variables, and any 
other errors made when specifying the model, is zero. Thus, we are 
asserting that the model is on average, correct. 
 
2) 2)var( σ=te . Each random error has a probability distribution with 
variance 2σ . The variance 2σ  is an unknown parameter and it 
measures the uncertainty in the statistical model. It is the same for each 
observation, so that for no observations will the model uncertainty be 
more, or less, nor is it directly related to any economic variable. Errors 
with this property are said to be homoskedastic.  
 
3) 0),cov( =st ee . The covariance between the two random errors 
corresponding to ant two different observations is zero. The size of the 
error for one observation has no bearing on the likely size of an error for 
another observation. Thus, any pair of errors is uncorrelated. 
 
4) We will sometimes further assume that the random errors te  have 
normal probability distributions. That is, ),0(~ 2σNet . 
 
Because each observation on the dependant variable ty , depends on the random error 
term te , each ty  is also a random variable. The statistical properties of ty  follow 
from those of te . These properties are: 
 
1) 33221)( ttt xxy βββ ++=Ε . The expected (average) vale of ty  depends 
on the value of the explanatory variables and the unknown parameters. 
This assumption is equivalent to 0)( =Ε te . It says that the average 
                                                 
77 Hill, Griffiths and Judge, Undergraduate econometrics (1997), p. 149 
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value of ty  changes for each observation and is given by the regression 
function 33221)( ttt xxy βββ ++=Ε .  
 
2) 2)var()var( σ== tt ey . The variance of the probability distribution of 
ty  does not change with each observation. Some observations on ty  are 
not more likely to be further from the regression function than others. 
 
3) 0),cov(),cov( == stst eeyy . Any two observations on the dependant 
variable are uncorrelated. For example, if one observation is above 
)( tyΕ , a subsequent observation is not more or less likely to be above 
)( tyΕ . 
 
4) We sometimes will assume that the variables of  ty  are normally 
distributed about their mean. That is ]),[(~ 233221 σβββ ttt xxNy ++ , 
which is equivalent to assuming that ),0(~ 2σNet . 
 
 
4.2 Regression Variables 
 
The variables chosen in our regression analysis, for the purpose of determining first-
day returns of IPOs, reflect factors possibly influencing the magnitude of under 
pricing, should it exist. Moreover, the variables are expected to show statistical 
significance specifying which variables within our formula determine first-day 
returns. 
 
Any expectations, on our part, as to how variables are expected to behave in this 
chapter are to be regarded as guesstimates that may or may not be accurate once the 
empirical study is concluded. 
 
The variables we determined to be most likely having an impact on first-day returns 
are: 
 
4.2.1 Field of Business (GICS) 
 
Companies whose fields of business differ should exhibit different valuations and 
expectations. These differences should give rise to industry specific factors affecting 
IPO’s. The period we are studying spawned a number of IPO’s whose underlying 
business was at a cyclical peak, for example the Information Technology sector. 
These industry specific factors should affect the pattern of initial first-day returns. 
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Therefore, we found a need to take this aspect into account in our regression analysis. 
We have chosen to divide the sectors into the Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) using the following dummy variables:  
 
Our expectations are that the “riskier” the Field of Business the company operates in, 
the larger the underpricing, or first-day return, should be. Therefore, “risky” sectors 
should show significantly higher first-day returns than less “risky” sectors. We define 
risky sectors as Information Technology and Telecommunications. 
 
 
• Industrials 
• Consumer Discretionary 
• Consumer Staples 
• Health Care 
• Financials 
• Information Technology 
• Telecommunication 
 
4.2.2 Investment Bank Employed 
 
Although Investment Banks employ similar, if not identical, valuation methods when 
valuating an IPO does not necessarily equate to identical issue prices. Therefore, we 
have chosen to include all major Swedish Investment Banks, who have participated in 
bringing a company to market, as dummy variables in our regression formula.  
 
Our expectations, concerning Investment Bank Employed dummy variables, is for 
them to, on average, be positively correlated with first day returns. We base this on 
the fact that IPOs in general show positive first day returns, which should translate 
into positive values for most Investment Banks Employed although some will 
undoubtedly be negative. 
 
 
• Enskilda 
• Carnegie 
• Handelsbanken 
• Swedbank 
• Hagströmer & Qviberg 
• Alfred Berg / ABN Amro 
• Morgan Stanley 
• Öhmans 
• Aros/Nordea 
• Various 
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4.2.3 Previous Owner Type 
 
Theories concerning IPOs generally assume that controlling parties go public as an 
exit option.78 Although this may be true in many cases, the motive to go public may 
significantly differ between different ownership groups. For instance, state owned 
companies which go public are often sold at a discount to the general public, hoping 
to gain trust among its subjects.79 According to Holmén and Högfeldt, family-
controlled firms trade at a discount because of the misallocation of control rights to 
heirs who make inefficient decisions, not because of extraction of pecuniary 
benefits.80 Further, many accuse private equity or venture capital firms of “pump and 
dump” schemes, rather than adding value to the company.81 Therefore, first-day 
returns could be significantly affected by the market taking into account whoever 
previously owned the company. We divided the companies into seven different 
groups as dummy variables. 
 
Our expectations are for companies previously owned by Venture Capital, Employees 
and Associated to experience lower first-day returns due to the facts stated above.  
 
• Family 
• Entrepreneur 
• Venture Capital 
• Employees 
• Associated 
• State or Community 
• Public Corporation 
 
4.2.4 Shift in Ownership 
 
IPO theory generally states that existing owners use IPO process as an avenue to exit 
the company. The Shift in Ownership variable is intended show in which companies 
existing majority stakeholders actually give up control through the IPO process. 
Companies who still retain the same majority stakeholders after the IPO may show 
different first-day returns than companies who don’t. However, a major critique that 
can be raised against this variable is that in many cases existing owner are not 
                                                 
78 Holmén M & Högfeldt P, “ A law and finance analysis of initial public offerings” (2003). 
79 Ibbotson R.G & Ritter J.R, “Initial Public Offerings” (1995) pp. 993-1016. 
80 Holmén M & Högfeldt P, “ A law and finance analysis of initial public offerings” (2003). 
81 Bjurgert E. & Johanson E. “The Private Equity Industri: share price and operating performance of 
private equity backed IPOs in Sweden and Finland. (2004). 
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allowed to sell their stakes until a certain amount of time has passed. We employ two 
dummy variables: 
 
Our expectation is for the Shift in Ownership variables to be negatively correlated 
with first-day returns. Owners who whish to surrender ownership are probably aware 
that the company’s outlook may not be promising, whereas companies who use the 
IPO to raise capital in order to finance further growth should exhibit a higher degree 
of underpricing. 
 
• Shift in Ownership 
• No Shift in Ownership 
 
4.2.5 IPO Motive 
 
A company’s decision to go public is a strategic undertaking motivated by a specific 
purpose. The underlying motive signals to the market whether, for example, the 
company is expected to grow quickly or if the motive is that existing owners wish to 
cash in. Thus, different motives should give rise to different magnitudes of first-day 
returns. We have divided the motives into six different groups as dummy variables 
and briefly explained the major themes underlying each motive. 
 
Our expectations are that motives which promote growth through reducing debt, 
increasing share liquidity or publicity should result in positive first-day returns. IPOs 
conducted with the underlying motive of enabling employee incentives or take-overs 
should have a negative correlation with first-day returns. Therefore, motives which 
are intended to increase growth should, on average, be more attractive than motives 
which promote or enable profligate spending. 
 
• Access to Capital Market  
Gives additional avenues to fund growth and raise working capital. 
• Take-over financed through Seasoned Equity Offering 
IPO is used to gain market access whereby purchasing company 
can pay for take-over using shares. 
• Reduce debt  
IPO is used to increase capital in order to reduce overall debt. 
• Increased share liquidity 
Enables existing owners to more easily enter and exit their holdings. 
• Incentives 
IPO is used to recruit and retain skilled employees as well as give 
them a stake in the development of the company. Controversial due 
to effect on shareholders. 
• Publicity 
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An attempt to gain prestige, respectability and widespread coverage 
of the company during the process. 
• Control Aspects 
Increases ease of transfer of control due to information aspects. 
 
4.2.6 IPO Procedure 
 
In our regression analysis we take the offer procedure into account. Offer procedures 
are conducted through a Fixed Price Offer or an Offer by tender. When an IPO goes 
public by using a Fixed Price Offer the Investment Bank sets a Fixed Price while 
selling the issue to interested parties. The second option, Offer by Tender, is 
conducted by investors bidding for the issue. These different IPO procedures could 
possibly affect first-day returns significantly which is why we chose to include them 
as two dummy variables. Further references as to why different IPO procedures may 
give rise to underpricing is found in Chapter 3, covering underpricing theories. 
 
Our expectations are for issues which are sold through Offer by Tender to be 
negatively correlated to first-day returns due to the fact that the issue price is set 
closer to the IPO than a fixed price is. The closer the offer price is set to the day of 
listing, the lower the risk of the investment is, whereas a fixed price offer tends to be 
set relatively low in order to attract investors, creating larger first-day returns. 
 
• Offer by Tender 
• Fixed Price Offer 
 
4.2.7 Firm Age 
 
The number of years a company has been in business should affect the first-day 
return. Our reasoning is that more mature companies, which we define as having been 
in business longer, should be easier to value and exhibit more moderate first-day 
returns. In our regression analysis we have converted a firm’s number of years in 
business to the logarithmic value. 
 
Our expectations are for age, as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty is negatively 
correlated with first-day returns. Reason being, the older a firm is, the easier it is to 
value. 
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4.2.8 Revenue 
 
The size of a company’s revenue indicates how large the company is. The larger the 
company, the smaller the valuation difficulties should be. Hence, we expect 
companies with larger revenues to exhibit smaller first-day returns. Therefore, we 
concluded that this was an essential variable to our regression function. The revenue 
variable has been converted to its logarithm in order to make firm comparisons and 
regression statistics more reliable. 
 
Our expectation is that the size of a company’s revenue should be negatively 
correlated with first-day returns. Companies who have large revenues should be 
easier to value and therefore there exists little reason for these companies offering 
price to significantly deviate after the first-day of trading.  
 
4.2.9 Operating Profits 
 
Reporting negative operating profits, can be expected to cause uncertainty about an 
issue and thereby make the company more difficult to value. Therefore, we have 
chosen to include and interpret a company’s operating profits as either positive or 
negative, assigned as a dummy variable to our regression function. 
 
Our expectations are for positive operating profits to be negatively correlated with 
first-day returns. Uncertainty concerning the operating profits will lead to issue being 
sold at a lower cost than the market will value the issue due to risk. 
 
• Positive Operating Profits  
• Negative Operating Profits 
 
4.2.10 Omitted Variables 
 
When trying to find a formula through which we hope to find variables that can 
determine, with somewhat success, the first-day returns of an IPO, there is an endless 
amount of variables which one can take into account. The variables we have chosen 
are selected on the basis of covering a wide range of areas which can affect the first-
day return.  
 
However, empirical studies are notorious in this regard. It is almost impossible to find 
a perfect formula determining future events by statistically studying previous events. 
What we do hope to find is a formula that produces reliable results with respect to the 
variables we have employed. Should we succeed in doing so, one might find a 
profitable trading strategy which can be employed. Cavat emptor!  
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4.3 Regression Specifics 
 
The following is intended to shed light on how the regression model was constructed 
and which purpose the different type of variable served. 
 
4.3.1 Dummy Variables 
 
Dummy variables allow us to construct models in which some or all regression model 
parameters, including the intercept, change for some observations in the example. 
Our method of predicting first-day returns is derived from the assumption that first-
day returns are explained as a function of company characteristics, stock market cycle 
and how the IPO is conducted. 
 
Dummy variables are used to account for qualitative factors in econometric models. 
They can also be called binary or dichotomous variables as they take just two values, 
1 or 0, to indicate the presence, or absence, of a characteristic. That is, a dummy 
variable is 1 if the characteristic is present and 0 otherwise.82 
 
Further, in the regression models we exclude one dummy variable from each set of 
characteristics, for example telecommunications in the sector denotation variable. 
This is done in order to sidestep exact collinearity problems. Mathematically it 
doesn’t matter which variable is omitted, we have however chosen to omit the 
variable referenced last in each dummy variable group.83 
 
In this paper, all of the variables except the logarithmic variables and the observation 
of first-day returns are binary.  
                                                 
82 Hill, Griffiths and Judge, Undergraduate econometrics (1997), p. 200. 
83 Ibid p. 200 
Millar, Wessel & Winnberg 44
4.3.2 Logarithmic Variables 
 
The regression models use logarithmic values when computing the age of a firm and 
the size of their revenue. This is done for two reasons, the first one being that large 
variation in numbers between firms may skew the data and produce unreliable results. 
The second is to minimize problems with hetroskedasticity, correlations and so on. 
  
 
4.4 Regression Tests 
 
The following tests are intended to be employed on our data in order to examine the 
validity, or statistical significance, of the results. 
 
4.4.1 The F-Test 
 
The F-Test is used for testing the overall significance of a model by including all 
explanatory variables. In order to examine whether our function is viable, we set up 
the following null and alternative hypotheses:84 
 
0,......,0,0: 210 === kH βββ  
:1H at least one of the kβ is nonzero 
 
The hypotheses states that every one of the parameters kβ , other than the intercept 
0β , is zero. If the hypothesis is true, none of the variables influence y, and thus the 
model has no statistical significance. If the alternative hypothesis 1H  is true, then at 
least one of the parameters is not zero, and thus one or more variables should be 
included in the model.85 
 
4.4.2 R-Squared 
 
The R-Squared value tests the goodness of fit. That is, the closer the R-squared value 
is to 1, the better the regression model fit. R-squared is a measure of the proportion of 
variation in the dependant variables that is explained by variations in the explanatory 
variable. The interpretation of an R-squared value of 30% is that 30% of the 
variations in y is explain by variations in the variables, leaving 70% unexplained.86 
                                                 
84 Hill, Griffiths and Judge, Undergraduate econometrics (1997) p.174. 
85 Ibid p. 81 
86 Ibid p.162. 
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4.4.3 Durbin-Watson Test 
 
The Durbin-Watson test is one of the most important tests for autocorrelation. 
Autocorrelation is a carryover from one period to another, where the current error 
term contains not only the effects of current shocks but also the carryover from 
previous shocks.87 
 
Should the Durbin-Watson statistic be close to 2, then one can conclude that the 
errors are not autocorrelated.88 
 
 
4.4.4 Jarque-Bera Test 
 
Hypothesis test and interval estimates rely on the assumption that errors, and hence 
the dependant variable y, are normally distributed. Thus when choosing a functional 
form, it is desirable to create a model in which the errors are normally distributed.89 
This assumption is checked by employing the Jarque-Bera Test. 
 
The Jarque-Bera test for normality is based on two measures: skewness and kurtosis. 
In the present context, skewness refers to how symmetric the residuals are around 
zero. Perfectly symmetric residuals will have a skewness of zero. Kurtosis refers to 
the “peakedness” of the distribution. For a normal distribution the kurtosis value is 
3.90 
 
                                                 
87Hill, Griffiths and Judge, Undergraduate econometrics (1997) p. 258 
88 Ibid p. 272 
89 Ibid p. 138 
90 Ibid p. 139 
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5 Econometric Study 
 
 
 
5.1 The Basic Regression Model  
 
The Basic Regression Model contains all observations, within our researched time 
period, together with all variables, identified as relevant. More specifically, it tests the 
hypothesis that it is possible to create an all encompassing regression formula, able to 
predict future returns with statistical certainty, based on past observations without 
consideration to stock market cycles. 
 
Our basic model is (the usual error term is omitted):91 
 
 
++++++= HQIBSWEIBSHBIBCARIBENSIByt _____ 543210 ββββββ  
 
+++++ INDSARNIBOHMIBMSIBALBIB _____ 109876 βββββ  
 
+++++ ITSFINSHLCSCSTSCDIS _____ 1514131211 βββββ  
 
+++++ ISLMREDMTOSMATCMFAGELn ____)( 2019181716 βββββ  
 
++++++ EMPPVCPENTPFAMPPUBMINCM ______ 262524232221 ββββββ
 
)(__ 323130292827 REVLnSIOPOPOBTGOVPASSP ββββββ +++++  
 
 
5.1.1 The Basic Regression Model Data 
 
The Basic Regression Model Data conclusively shows that it’s not possible to create 
an all encompassing regression formula, able to predict future returns with statistical 
certainty, based on past observations without consideration taken to, for example, 
stock market cycles with the method employed. Statistics show: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 See Appendix 9.1  
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Dependent Variable: FIRSTDAYRETURN 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/28/05   Time: 21:34 
Sample: 1 107 
Included observations: 107 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IB_ENS -0.861328 0.838746 -1.026923 0.3078 
IB_CAR -0.565656 0.835166 -0.677298 0.5003 
IB_SHB -0.362891 0.874406 -0.415015 0.6793 
IB_SWE 1.601742 1.040624 1.539213 0.1280 
IB_HQ -0.288588 0.920428 -0.313537 0.7548 
IB_ALB -0.070152 0.971569 -0.072205 0.9426 
IB_MS -1.944393 1.651082 -1.177648 0.2427 
IB_OHM -1.726702 1.720166 -1.003800 0.3187 
IB_ARN -0.755969 1.047802 -0.721481 0.4729 
S_IND -0.926258 2.191934 -0.422576 0.6738 
S_CDI -0.517238 2.157841 -0.239702 0.8112 
S_CST -2.782994 3.055186 -0.910908 0.3653 
S_HLC -2.308144 2.238441 -1.031139 0.3058 
S_FIN -1.917553 2.302068 -0.832970 0.4075 
S_IT -0.669596 2.167676 -0.308900 0.7583 
FAGE 0.523096 0.251049 2.083643 0.0406 
M_ATC -0.510771 0.673970 -0.757854 0.4509 
M_TOS -0.667304 0.547585 -1.218630 0.2269 
M_RED 0.361352 0.671849 0.537847 0.5923 
M_ISL 0.165814 0.505828 0.327807 0.7440 
M_INC 0.230697 0.597381 0.386180 0.7005 
M_PUB 0.714821 0.479360 1.491199 0.1402 
P_FAM -1.865507 0.757918 -2.461357 0.0162 
P_ENT -1.282457 0.641662 -1.998649 0.0493 
P_VC -1.202367 0.590397 -2.036541 0.0453 
P_EMP -1.788825 1.362780 -1.312629 0.1934 
P_ASS -2.103937 1.380665 -1.523858 0.1318 
P_GOV 0.072253 1.563079 0.046225 0.9633 
OBT 0.238357 0.544382 0.437849 0.6628 
POP 0.015629 0.594910 0.026272 0.9791 
SIO -0.128531 0.635317 -0.202310 0.8402 
REV -0.474384 0.171856 -2.760354 0.0073 
C 3.874608 2.517482 1.539081 0.1280 
R-squared 0.325051 Mean dependent var 0.211810 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033182 S.D. dependent var 1.932134 
S.E. of regression 1.899808 Akaike info criterion 4.369441 
Sum squared resid 267.0859 Schwarz criterion 5.193771 
Log likelihood -200.7651 F-statistic 1.113687 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.064701 Prob(F-statistic) 0.344519 
 
 
F-Statistic (1.113687) is too low to reject the null hypothesis: 
 
0,......,0,0: 210 === kH βββ  
 
This means that we have to accept that the variables chosen have no effect on the 
first-day return. Thus, The Basic Regression Model results have no statistical 
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significance. However, as can be seen in the regression printout t-statistics, certain 
variables do show significance in relation to The Basic Regression Model.  
 
R-Squared (0.325051) is sufficiently high to be regarded as having a good fit. 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic (2.064701) is within the acceptable range showing that The 
Basic Regression Model does not have any problems relating to autocorrelation. 
 
 
5.1.2 Residual Analysis 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1 107
Observations 107
Mean      -5.27E-16
Median  -0.127851
Maximum  9.502709
Minimum -2.801190
Std. Dev.   1.587350
Skewness   3.043891
Kurtosis   17.97517
Jarque-Bera  1165.037
Probability  0.000000
 
Residuals from The Basic Regression Model clearly show that the residuals are not 
normally distributed, Jarque-Bera (1165.037), which is one of our assumptions in the 
model. Thus, conclusion can be drawn that it is unreasonable to expect the residuals 
to be normally distributed. 
 
The residual printout shows problems with both Skewness (3.04389) and Kurtosis or 
peakedness (17.97517). These problems are directly related to the four largest first-
day return observations. 
 
 
5.2 The Modified Basic Regression Model 
 
The Modified Basic Regression Model is conducted in the exact same way as The 
Basic Regression Model. Difference being, that we have excluded seven observations 
in order to correct the problems encountered in The Basic Regression Model. The 
excluded observations are the four largest first-day returns and the three observations 
during 2004. The reason for excluding these seven observations is that the first four 
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observations make the residuals unmanageable, while the 2004 observations exhibit 
different IPO patterns due to a shift in the stock market cycle. The excluded 
companies are: 
 
 
• Daydream Software   (1536.43%) 
• Cybercom   (243.55%) 
• Wedins Norden   (972.18%) 
• Svenska Orient Linjen   (682.85%) 
• Oriflame Cosmetics  (2004) 
• Unibet   (2004) 
• NOTE   (2004) 
 
 
5.2.1 The Modified Basic Regression Model Data 
 
The Modified Basic Regression Model has produced results which exhibit statistical 
significance. That is, a function to predict future first-day returns based on past 
observations. 92 
 
Statistics show: 
 
Dependent Variable: FIRSTDAYRETURN 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/29/05   Time: 15:23 
Sample: 1 100 
Included observations: 100 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
IB_ENS -0.264870 0.166931 -1.586704 0.1173 
IB_CAR -0.128061 0.164715 -0.777472 0.4396 
IB_SHB 0.113194 0.173577 0.652125 0.5166 
IB_SWE 0.106595 0.224216 0.475415 0.6360 
IB_HQ -0.505660 0.195685 -2.584050 0.0120 
IB_ALB -0.432284 0.199330 -2.168684 0.0337 
IB_MS -0.290128 0.321401 -0.902698 0.3699 
IB_OHM 0.332156 0.343507 0.966955 0.3370 
IB_ARN -0.382807 0.206280 -1.855766 0.0679 
S_IND -0.273591 0.421684 -0.648805 0.5187 
S_CDI -0.423066 0.414728 -1.020106 0.3113 
S_CST 0.159036 0.601279 0.264496 0.7922 
S_HLC -0.006010 0.420048 -0.014308 0.9886 
S_FIN -0.083380 0.442599 -0.188388 0.8511 
S_IT -0.037228 0.417579 -0.089153 0.9292 
FAGE 0.070129 0.049700 1.411034 0.1629 
M_ATC -0.025632 0.130959 -0.195722 0.8454 
                                                 
92 See Appendix 9.2 
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M_TOS -0.034008 0.108864 -0.312388 0.7557 
M_RED 0.114451 0.145764 0.785176 0.4351 
M_ISL 0.097341 0.099866 0.974710 0.3332 
M_INC -0.158584 0.125268 -1.265955 0.2099 
M_PUB 0.071521 0.095507 0.748858 0.4566 
P_FAM -0.153183 0.154433 -0.991907 0.3248 
P_ENT -0.139428 0.126986 -1.097977 0.2761 
P_VC -0.182550 0.117822 -1.549370 0.1260 
P_EMP 0.197302 0.270033 0.730658 0.4675 
P_ASS -0.530033 0.268644 -1.972993 0.0526 
P_GOV -0.073251 0.305132 -0.240063 0.8110 
OBT 0.134126 0.101419 1.322487 0.1905 
POP -0.154781 0.109697 -1.410982 0.1629 
SIO 0.154239 0.127124 1.213290 0.2293 
REV -0.002651 0.023120 -0.114642 0.9091 
C 0.165820 0.478166 0.346783 0.7298 
R-squared 0.440485 Mean dependent var -0.119815 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173254 S.D. dependent var 0.400134 
S.E. of regression 0.363824 Akaike info criterion 1.075228 
Sum squared resid 8.868640 Schwarz criterion 1.934934 
Log likelihood -20.76142 F-statistic 1.648332 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.769685 Prob(F-statistic) 0.043356 
 
 
F-Statistic (1.648332) rejects the null hypothesis: 
 
0,......,0,0: 210 === kH βββ  
 
This means that we reject the hypothesis that the variables have no effect on first-day 
returns. Thus, the F-Test concludes, on the 5% level, that the variables chosen are not 
rejected as statistically significant determinants relating to the magnitude of first-day 
returns. 
 
R-Squared (0.440485) is under the circumstances very high and shows that 44.0485% 
of the variations in first-day returns are explained by the model, leaving 
approximately 56% unexplained. 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic (1.769685) is within the acceptable range showing that The 
Basic Regression Model does not have any problems relating to autocorrelation. 
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5.2.2 Residual Analysis 
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Mean      -3.89E-18
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Skewness  -0.058010
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Residuals from The Modified Basic Regression Model show that the residuals are 
normally distributed, Jarque-Bera (1.467102). Thus, conclusion can be drawn that it 
is not unreasonable to expect the residuals to be normally distributed. 
 
The residual printout shows a Skewness value of (-0.058010), which is very close to 
zero and a Kurtosis or peakedness value of (3.581931), which is close to the optimal 
3. Pervious problems relating to the four largest first-day returns have now been 
removed from the residuals. 
 
 
5.3 The Boom-Bust Regression Model 
 
The Boom-Bust Regression Model is intended to see if we can find a higher 
significance in the model if we take stock market cycles into account by determining 
any possible change in IPO returns due to the effect of overall market sentiment. We 
have defined the Boom period to be (January 1996 – March 2000 and all observation 
during 2004) and the Bust (April 2000 – December 2002). No observations were 
recorded during 2003. Thus, the 2004 observations are included, but this time as a 
boom period. When defining the Boom and Bust periods, we defined the Boom 
period as the period of time when the stock market had a rising trend and the Bust 
period corresponds to a falling trend in the market. However, the four large first-day 
return observations are still excluded due to residual problems. 
 
The dummy variable, ( BUSTBOOM _33β ), is added in The Boom-Bust Regression 
Model, taking the value 1 during “boom times” and 0 when stock market stock 
market sentiment is negative, also characterized as “bust”. 
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5.3.1 The Boom-Bust Regression Model Data 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FIRSTDAYRETURN 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/29/05   Time: 16:06 
Sample(adjusted): 1 103 
Included observations: 103 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
FAGE 0.046474 0.049230 0.944019 0.3485 
IB_ALB -0.476938 0.202247 -2.358192 0.0212 
IB_ARN -0.407702 0.211059 -1.931694 0.0575 
IB_CAR -0.127498 0.169415 -0.752579 0.4543 
IB_ENS -0.276833 0.170298 -1.625577 0.1086 
IB_HQ -0.378437 0.186263 -2.031740 0.0460 
IB_MS -0.324477 0.327012 -0.992247 0.3245 
IB_OHM 0.313374 0.354240 0.884638 0.3794 
IB_SHB 0.098046 0.176543 0.555364 0.5804 
IB_SWE 0.073379 0.227715 0.322239 0.7482 
M_ATC -0.008334 0.128760 -0.064725 0.9486 
M_INC -0.188476 0.126494 -1.489996 0.1408 
M_ISL 0.065005 0.101571 0.639995 0.5243 
M_PUB 0.096041 0.096616 0.994044 0.3237 
M_RED 0.089232 0.134039 0.665721 0.5078 
M_TOS -0.076267 0.109466 -0.696722 0.4883 
OBT 0.093861 0.115077 0.815643 0.4175 
P_ASS -0.493428 0.273528 -1.803941 0.0756 
P_EMP 0.182357 0.274769 0.663673 0.5091 
P_ENT -0.131454 0.129341 -1.016337 0.3130 
P_FAM -0.212908 0.150815 -1.411716 0.1625 
P_GOV -0.110144 0.306847 -0.358952 0.7207 
P_VC -0.181540 0.121074 -1.499414 0.1383 
POP -0.087302 0.110225 -0.792034 0.4311 
REV 0.007415 0.023283 0.318474 0.7511 
S_CDI -0.496202 0.442367 -1.121696 0.2659 
S_CST 0.135325 0.614836 0.220099 0.8264 
S_FIN -0.181047 0.460215 -0.393396 0.6952 
S_HLC -0.078443 0.436984 -0.179510 0.8581 
S_IND -0.355629 0.439673 -0.808848 0.4214 
S_IT -0.151929 0.440279 -0.345074 0.7311 
BOOM_BUST -0.096297 0.110862 -0.868626 0.3881 
SIO 0.234374 0.113327 2.068122 0.0424 
C 0.306274 0.523114 0.585482 0.5601 
R-squared 0.408034 Mean dependent var -0.113460 
Adjusted R-squared 0.124920 S.D. dependent var 0.396718 
S.E. of regression 0.371112 Akaike info criterion 1.114949 
Sum squared resid 9.502989 Schwarz criterion 1.984665 
Log likelihood -23.41985 F-statistic 1.441235 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.790156 Prob(F-statistic) 0.101412 
 
 
Millar, Wessel & Winnberg 53
Although pervious problems relating to the three returns during 2004 have been 
solved, the results of The Boom-Bust Regression Model has failed, by a small 
margin, to deliver results that exhibit statistical significance on the 5- and 10% 
level.93 Furthermore, the Boom Bust model states that first-day returns are negatively 
affected by Boom periods. Statistics show: 
 
F-Statistic (1.441235) falls just outside the rejection range for the null hypothesis on 
the 10% level. 
 
0,......,0,0: 210 === kH βββ  
 
This means that we have to accept that the variables chosen have no effect on the 
first-day return. Thus, The Boom-Bust Regression Model results have no statistical 
significance, albeit with a small margin (0.14%). However, as can be seen in the 
regression printout t-statistics, certain variables do show significance in relation to 
The Boom-Bust Regression Model.94  
 
R-Squared (0.408034) shows a high value for goodness of fit. 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic (1.790156) is within the acceptable range showing that The 
Boom-Bust Regression Model does not have any problems relating to 
autocorrelation. 
 
5.3.2 Residual Analysis 
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Probability  0.700278
 
 
                                                 
93 See Appendix 9.3 
94 See Appendix 9  
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Residuals from The Boom-Bust Regression Model show that the residuals are 
normally distributed, Jarque-Bera (0.712555). Thus, conclusion can be drawn that it 
is not unreasonable to expect the residuals to be normally distributed. Thereby, we 
can not reject the hypothesis that the residuals are not normally distributed. 
 
The residual printout shows a Skewness value of (-0.058010), which is very close to 
zero and a Kurtosis or peakedness value of (3.581931), which is close to the optimal 
value of 3.  
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6. Analysis 
 
 
6.1 Descriptives 
 
6.1.1 Newly listed firms 
 
Between 1996 and May 2005, 258 new firms registered on the A-, O-, and OTC-lists 
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Out of these 258 firms, 124 were identified as 
clean IPOs. However, our regressions are conducted on a sample of 107 observations 
due to data incompleteness. One third of the firms reported as newly listed, are 
simply transferred from other markets, such as Nya Marknaden, SBI and IM.   
 
Panel 6A. Newly listed firms on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (A-, O-, and 
OTC-lists) between 1996 and 2004 
       
    N  % 
              
       
Newly listed firms 1996 - 2004  258  100 
 Clean Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)  124  48 
 Equity carve-outs and spin-offs  43  17 
 Firms transfering from other lists  78  30 
 Mergers   7  3 
 Restructurings  6  2 
              
Notes. Data source; the official records from the OMX-group. 
 
6.1.2 First-day Returns 
 
Previous studies have reported spectacular returns on the floatation day although 
recent findings indicate lower returns. A student paper from the Gothenburg School 
of Business and Economics, covering a similar, although smaller, sample than do our 
study, reported average first-day returns of 11.47 %.95 This can be compared to the 
21.18 % average first day return that we found in our sample. It should be noted that 
this figure includes some non representative returns.  
 
                                                 
95 Andersson E. & Persson L. “Nyintroduktioner -En undersökning av underpris och långsiktig 
prestation av nyintroducerade aktier på Stockholmsbörsen” (2005). 
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the yearly average first-day returns. Our sample does not present 
returns that match the previously reported levels of underpricing. Instead, during 
many years the yearly first-day returns are negative.  
 
Figure 6.1. Average First-Day Returns between 1996 and 2004 
 
Notes. During the time period 1996 to 2005:5, 124 clean IPOs were identified. Yearly number of IPOs 
was 10, 37, 14, 31, 20, 7, 4, 0, 3, 0 respectively. In the chart, three IPOs from our sample were 
excluded due to abnormally high first-day returns. From the 1997 sample Svenska Orient Linien 
(1dRET = 682 %) and Wedins Norden (1dRET = 972 %) were excluded. From the 2000 sample 
Daydream Software was excluded (1dRET = 1536 %). The tree IPOs with largest negative first-day 
returns were excluded to match the omission of above mentioned IPOs. 
 
6.1.3 Field of Business (GICS) 
 
Figure 6.2 below, indicates that some industries produce higher first-day returns than 
others. The best investment sector according to this data presentation would be 
Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Information Technology and 
Telecommunications.  
 
However, this presentation is somewhat misleading. First-day returns change over 
time and this data sample is an average over the researched period. Secondly, the 
telecommunications sector only has one observation, hardly qualifying it as 
statistically significant. Furthermore, we have not excluded the very large first-day 
returns in this sample. For example, Information Technology would exhibit negative 
returns over the period had it not been for Daydreams first-day return which 
increased its market value by approximately 1536%. Taking these factors into 
account we find that the regression results from The Modified Basic Regression 
Model produce a more accurate account of sector returns. 
 
Millar, Wessel & Winnberg 57
Figure 6.2. Average Industry First-day Returns  
 
Notes. The sample consists of 107 firms. No instances of IPOs from firms belonging to Energy or 
Materials were found, which is why these two industries are excluded from the figure. Industrials (N = 
18), Consumer Dicr. (N = 18), Consumer Staples (N = 1), Health Care (N = 12), Financials (N = 9), 
Information Technology (N = 44) and Telecom (N = 1).  
 
 
Firms in comparable fields of business should exhibit similar characteristics. These 
prerequisites produce cluster-like behaviour, which also affects strategic decisions 
such as an IPO. Noteworthy from Panel B below, is the high frequency of 
Information Technology companies performing IPOs between 1997 and 2000.  
 
Panel 6B. IPOs on SSE Categorized by Industry (GICS) 
                    
Year Industrials Cons. D Cons. S Health C. Financials IT Telecom Total Index
           
         
1996 2 3 0 3 0 2 0 10 38
1997 7 6 3 4 6 11 0 37 24
1998 6 1 0 2 1 4 0 14 10
1999 2 3 0 1 2 21 0 29 66
2000 1 3 0 2 0 13 2 21 -12
2001 0 1 0 2 1 2 0 6 -17
2002 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 -37
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
2004 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 18
           
         
Sum (%) 20 (16%) 21 (17%) 3 (2 %) 14 (11 %) 10 (8%) 54 (44 %) 2 (2 %) 124  
            
Notes. Panel B represents the entire sample of 124 clean IPOs identified between 1996 and mid-2005. 
The last column ‘Index’, show the percentage change in SX All Share Index over the year. 
 
6.1.4 Investment Bank Employed 
 
The literature has previously discussed that the higher prestige the investment bank 
employed in an IPO enjoys, the lower the magnitude of underpricing, or first-day 
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returns, should be, since the bank’s renown would guarantee the soundness of the 
IPO. This hypothesis, however, is rejected for the Swedish market by Hansson and 
Larsson.96 For that reason, we did not investigate the possible impact of the employed 
investment bank’s reputation. However, as discussed in section 3.3.3 Financial 
Intermediaries, the bank plays an important role in the IPO process. Figure 6.3 on the 
following page reports that the majority (87 %) of the firms chose one out of seven 
investment banks, namely; Carnegie, Enskilda, Handelsbanken, Alfred Berg, H & Q, 
Aros/Nordea or Swedbank.  
 
 
6.3. Investment Bank Employed            6.4. Previous Owner Type 
 
 
 
Notes. Both diagrams represent the sample used in our regression analysis (N = 107). Figure 6.3. 
Frequency of IPOs sorted by Investment Bank Employed. The chart reports a fairly fragmented 
frequency. Figure 6.4. Frequency of IPOs categorized by Owner Type prior to floatation date. The 
chart shows that the majority of IPOs are made from four owner type groups; Public Corporations, 
Family, Entreneur and Venture Capital. 
 
6.1.5 Previous Owner Type and Shift in Ownership 
 
As illustrated by Figure 6.4 above, 92 % of the investigated IPOs were made by one 
of four owner type groups; Public Corporations, Family, Entrepreneur or Venture 
Capital. In 88 out of 107 cases, the current owners retained control and ownership of 
the company.   
 
                                                 
96 Hansson P. & Larsson, E. ”Asymmetrisk information och underprissättning vid börsintroduktioner” 
(1994). 
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6.1.6 IPO Motive 
 
Figure 6.5. Motive for Going Public  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Some firms had multiple motives for going public. Each bar represents the sample of 107 firms. 
 
The two most common motives, stated by the firms, for performing an IPO was 
Access to Capital Markets and increased Publicity. This is hardly surprising, given 
that a company does not reveal any new information in stating these motives. More 
interesting is the fact that 30 firms noted Take-Over through SEO as a motive, clearly 
indicating an aggressive growth strategy. Also noteworthy, are the 14 firms that 
declared debt reduction as a motive for going public. This motive could very well be 
badly received by investors, since using raised capital to pay off debt implies that the 
firm does not have any new investments planned, which in its turn means that there is 
not much growth potential for the invested money. 
 
6.1.7 IPO Procedure 
 
In our sample, 60 IPOs were priced using fixed price procedure and 47 firms used 
offer by tender procedure. After 1999, offer by tender pricing was the dominant 
procedure.  
 
6.1.8 Firm Characteristics for the Boom-Bust Periods 
 
Our time period, 1996 to 2004 can be divided into two periods; Boom and Bust. One 
might expect differentiations between the two periods. However, the data does not 
support these expectations. Panel C reports firm characteristics for the entire time 
period, as well as characteristics divided into the Boom-Bust classification. The large 
1 = Access to Capital Market 
2 = TO financed  through SEO 
3 = Reduce Debt 
4 = Increased Share Liquidity 
5 = Control Aspects 
6 = Incentives 
7 = Publicity 
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difference, in the total sample, between mean and median values for sales and IPO 
offer size, can be partly attributed to Scania’s comparatively large values (sales = 
34.9 billion SEK and offer size = 18.8 billion SEK).  
 
Panel C. Firm Characteristics at the IPO 
          
     Total sample   Boom sample     Bust sample 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean  Median
          
                    
Firm Age (years) 18.8 11  18.5 11  19.8 12.5 
SalesA  (M SEK) 1179.6 228  989.5 228.0  1667.5 277.5 
Operating ProfitB  (M SEK) 59.8 18.3  25.3 19.2  148.1 13.7 
IPO Offer Size (M SEK) 691.1 169.4  587.9 127  952.5 379.5 
1dRET (%)  21.2 0.8  11.3 0  -4.8C 1.7 
                    
Notes. Sample consists of the 107 firms, which were included in the regressions. ‘Total Sample’ refers 
to all IPOs between 1996 and 2004. Boom sample are all IPOs listed between 1996 and March 2000 
and Bust sample includes firms from April 2000 onwards. A: Sales reported for the fiscal year prior to 
IPO. B: Operating profits reported for the fiscal year prior to IPO. C: From this value, one company, 
Daydream Software (1dRET = 1536 %), was excluded.    
 
6.2 Interpretation of Regression Models 
 
 
Regression statistics results are expressed as a percentage change in first-day returns. 
Dummy variables, which take the value 1 or 0, affect first-day returns by the exact 
amount stated by theβ  value, should the dummy variable be 1. Otherwise, first-day 
return effect of the specific β  value is zero. Logarithmic variables affect first day 
returns by the logarithmic value multiplied by the β  value.97  
 
Analysis is based on The Modified Basic Regression Model since it is the only 
statistically significant model. The excluded regression models where not found to be 
reliable. Hence, any conclusions drawn from them would be subject to unreliability. 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 See Appendix for complete list of explanations for variables 
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6.3 The Modified Basic Regression Model 
 
6.3.1 The complete function of The Modified Basic Regression 
Model 
 
 
+++= CARIBENSIByt _)-0.128061(_)-0.264870()0.165820( 210 βββ  
 
+++ HQIBSWEIBSHBIB _)-0.505660(_)0.106595(_)0.113194( 543 βββ  
 
+++ OHMIBMSIBALBIB _(0.332156)_)(-0.290128_)(-0.432284 876 βββ  
 
+++ CDISINDSARNIB _)(-0.423066_)(-0.273591_)(-0.382807 11109 βββ  
 
+++ FINSHLCSCSTS _)(-0.083380_)(-0.006010_(0.159036) 141312 βββ  
 
+++ ATCMFAGELnITS _)(-0.025632)((0.070129)_)(-0.037228 171615 βββ  
 
+++ ISLMREDMTOSM _(0.097341)_(0.114451)_)(-0.034008 201918 βββ  
 
+++ FAMPPUBMINCM _)(-0.153183_(0.071521)_)(-0.158584 232221 βββ  
 
+++ EMPPVCPENTP _(0.197302)_)(-0.182550_)(-0.139428 262524 βββ  
 
+++ OBTGOVPASSP 292827 (0.134126)_)(-0.073251_)(-0.530033 βββ  
 
)()(-0.002651(0.154239))(-0.154781 323130 REVLnSIOPOP βββ ++  
 
 
6.3.2 Analysis of The Modified Regression Model Variables 
 
Regression values assigned to eachβ  value indicate the effect of each variable on ty , 
first-day returns. The regression intercept value, 0β , is the constant from which all 
future predictions have their reference point before being manipulated by the 
variables.  
 
We are aware of the fact that our results are not quite suitable to draw general result 
due to the fact that most of the variables have little or no statistical significance, 
whereas the model as a whole had a low F-statistic indicating that the model is 
statistically significant. These contradictory results are somewhat puzzling. The most 
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plausible reason for our lack of significance in many variables could be the result of 
having few observations with regard to our many variables, resulting in some 
variables only containing one or two observations. However, regression results 
tended to deteriorate when trying to exclude one or more variables, leaving The 
Modified Regression Model best suited for our purpose. 
 
The Investment Bank Employed dummy variables assume that if they all take the 
value zero, an alternate Investment Bank is employed denoted as Various. The 
Investment Banks that fall under the group Various neither have a positive nor 
negative impact on IPOs. When examining the Investment Banks effect on first day 
returns we can clearly detect certain trends. Enskilda, Carnegie, Morgan Stanley, 
Alfred Berg, Aros/Nordea and Hagströmer & Qviberg affect first-day returns 
negatively, in relation to Various, between -12 and -50.5%,  indicating that it is best 
to steer clear of any IPOs they handle. However, IPOs handled by Svenska 
Handelsbanken, Swedbank and Öhman influence the expected first-day returns 
positively between, 10.6 and 33.2%. Taken together, these results confirm our 
expectations, that the average IPO would be slightly positively affected with regard to 
the Investment Bank Employed correlation to first-day returns.  
 
At first glance, first-day returns in all sectors, Consumer Staples excluded, seem very 
negative. However, this is somewhat misleading since the excluded dummy variable 
is Telecommunications, which is the first-day returns the other sectors are compared 
to. Furthermore, Telecommunications only has one observation over the 1996 - 2004 
period, Tele1, which had a first-day return of 34.25%, making the other sectors look 
negative in comparison. Somewhat surprisingly, consumer staples showed a return of 
15.9% in excess of that in Telecommunications, which can be explained due to the 
fact that the sector only has one observation. Looking at the variables we can see that 
our expectations regarding the correlation to first-day returns were not far off the 
mark. Sectors with high “risk”, which we defined as Telecommunications and IT, 
performed admirably compared to less “risky” sectors such as Industrials and 
Consumer Discretionary.  
 
The age of a company is positively correlated to its first-day return. More 
specifically, the logarithmic value of the firms age multiplied by the β  value 
(0.070129) results in large positive first-day returns for more mature companies. This 
observation seems to run counter to rational thought and existing theory since more 
mature companies should be easier to value and predict first day returns of. This 
result runs counter to our expectations stated in chapter 4.  We expected first-day 
returns to be negatively correlated with a company’s age. This discrepancy could in 
some part be explained by older companies having fewer negative first-day returns. 
However, we are at a loss to explain the discrepancy, especially since the variable, 
although not significant, has a lower probability value than most other variables. 
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The motive underlying the decision to go public is Control Aspects unless any of the 
other dummy variables take the value 1. From the data we can see that firms who 
choose to go public due to a desire to Access capital Markets are punished with a 
negative return of 2.56% compared to firms going public due to Control Aspects. 
Other motives which punish companies seeking to go public are Take-Overs through 
Seasoned Equity Offerings, -3.4% and Incentives, -15.86%. This last statistic is 
interesting. Companies who actively seek to go public in order to award employees, 
or management, with stock option programs are severely punished. This observation 
seems logical when viewed against the fact that shareholders will bear the brunt of 
the cost through share dilution. This motive should rightly be punished by the stock 
market when comparing it against the motive of raising capital to finance expansion. 
Companies whose motive to go public is due to a need to increase share liquidity, 
+9.73%, reduce debt, +11.4%,or gain publicity exposure, +7.15%, are generally 
positively awarded by the market. The reason behind this is rather straightforward. 
Companies in the second category are generally seeking to grow while companies in 
the first sector whish to cash out or lavishly spend money on take-overs and 
employee incentives. These observations more or less exactly how we expected the 
variables to behave. 
 
IPO theory generally assumes that controlling parties go public as an exit option.98 
Regression data on previous owners excluded the dummy variable Public 
Corporations, in order to sidestep the dummy variable trap. Looking at the regression, 
all variables except Employees show negative values in relation to Public 
Corporations. The negative values all, except Associated, -53%, lie between -7 and -
20%. The Associated value can not be regarded as reliable since it only contains two 
observations, both negative, with one of the observations showing a -98% drop on its 
first day of trading. The large discrepancy between the Employee variable in relation 
to the rest may seem remarkable at first until one examines the data with greater 
scrutiny, revealing only one observation, MSC Konsult, +53%, skewing the data. Due 
to the fact that the previous owner group Public Corporations, on average, exhibit 
highly positive returns, making the other previous owner group first-day returns 
appear dismal. Regression result where approximately what we expected to find, with 
the exception of the large deviations in Employee and Associated due to small data 
samples in these groups. 
 
Offering Procedures can be conducted in one of two ways, as covered in chapter 4. 
The Dummy variable takes the value 1 when the Offer Procedure is conducted 
through Offer by Tender and 0 when the price is fixed. Regression results show that 
Offering Procedures conducted by employing Offer by Tender give rise to larger 
first-day returns. These results run completely counter to what we expected the 
regression results to show. Our expectations where for the Offer by Tender to show a 
                                                 
98 Holmén M & Högfeldt P, “ A law and finance analysis of initial public offerings” (2003). 
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lower first-day return based on the fact that the final issue price is set at a later date. 
However, as the regression shows, this is not at all the case and can possibly be 
explained by the low significance of the variable and fixed price IPOs initially being 
priced to high. 
 
According to the findings in our regression analysis, companies who have positive 
earnings when going public exhibit, on average, 15.5% lower first-day returns. Thus, 
for companies who have positive earnings, the Positive Operating Profits variable is 
1. This phenomenon can be explained by the large number of companies listed during 
the heydays of the IT boom without any profits and posting large first-day returns. 
These results are in line with what we expected from the regression. Companies who 
are harder to asses due to negative Operating Profits should rightly be sold at a 
discount to the market, making them more underpriced. Thereby attracting investors 
to the issue. 
 
The Shift in Ownership variable takes on the value 1 when there has been a shift in 
company ownership during the IPO process, otherwise 0. Regression data shows that 
companies who shift ownership during the IPO process return, on average, +15.4% 
more. This data is somewhat questionable due to the fact that the selection sample 
contains only 10% of total observations with some large first-day returns skewing the 
sample. In light of this we can not draw any real conclusions regarding the regression 
results compared to our expectations. We did however expect the opposite outcome 
where a Shift in Ownership signalled that present management knew something 
wasn’t right with the company and wanted to sell out while they could. However, 
should that be the case, the issue might be sold to the public at a discount. 
Furthermore, the variable is not statistically significant. 
 
Our final variable in The Modified Regression Model, Revenue, is negatively 
correlated to first-day returns. That is, higher logarithmic values of a company’s 
revenues more negatively affect first-day returns. This is logical. Companies who 
have large revenues tend to be easier to value, and therefore have less uncertainty 
surrounding their IPOs, thereby limiting the upside potential of first-day returns. 
These results are what we expected to find in our regression model. 
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7. Summary 
 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
 
 
When a company performs an IPO it is valuated by the market for the first time. An 
overpriced IPO will lead to negative first-day returns and thus bad publicity. On the 
other hand, a heavily underpriced IPO is equivalent to leaving money on the table. 
Hence, it is in the best interest of every company considering an IPO to set a fair offer 
price. However, previous studies find that underwriters appear to make systematic 
errors in using historic accounting data when setting the offer prices of IPOs. Further, the 
underpricing and cyclicality phenomenon as well as other trends associated with IPOs are 
of utmost importance to investors and companies considering an IPO. In this paper 
we focused on the relation between the magnitude of first-day returns and a number 
of broad factors, including; accounting information, ownership information, 
underlying IPO motives, the market conditions at the time of the IPO and IPO 
procedure. Our purpose is to model determinants affecting the magnitude of first-day 
returns, using a sample that covers 107 IPOs on the Stockholm stock exchange, 
between 1996 and 2004.  
 
In light of this purpose, we feel that we have found a model, The Modified Basic 
Regression Model, explaining the determinants of first-day returns. The Modified 
Basic Regression Model is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, 
examination of the significance of the individual dummy variables shows that they 
are not significant. Our model has a conundrum; according to the F-statistic our 
model is significant, while when looking at the significance of individual variables 
the model appears somewhat unreliable. Residuals are normally distributed and 
regression tests show that the data is reliable. Furthermore, our results show that 44% 
of first-day returns can be explained, leaving 56% unexplained by our model.  
 
Our expectations as to how most variables would behave were correct even though 
the Shift in Ownership and IPO procedure variables turned out to behave in the 
opposite manner.  
 
Looking at historical data and trying to find a model which can shed light on future 
outcomes, one must be aware that our observed period is, to a great extent, an 
anomaly in time. During our observation period, global stock markets entered a blow 
off faze, followed by a subsequent bust. The results from this bust have yet to be 
digested in that the present recovery is largely based on lowered interest rates 
designed to alleviate effects from the stock market retreat. Our point is, it is difficult 
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to determine, with a degree of certainty, the magnitude of each variables impact on 
first-day returns. Having raised this warning, data results still shows that our 
regression model can be deemed successful, although problems regarding the 
individual variables significance exist. This revelation is hardly surprising since 
doing so is virtually impossible. Instead, our findings show, with a high degree of 
certainty, which behavioural characteristics can be expected during the first-day of 
trading, given the input variables we have chosen.  
 
 
7.2 Suggestions to further research 
 
IPO literature is in large part based on finding hypotheses which can explain the 
underpricing phenomenon rather than looking at which characteristics give rise to 
them. Therefore, we suggest that further research efforts be directed at this area. 
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9. Appendix 
 
9.1 Regression Tables 
 
9.1.1 The Basic Regression model 
 
Dependent Variable: FIRSTDAYRETURN 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/28/05   Time: 21:34 
Sample: 1 107 
Included observations: 107 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
IB_ENS -0.861328 0.838746 -1.026923 0.3078 
IB_CAR -0.565656 0.835166 -0.677298 0.5003 
IB_SHB -0.362891 0.874406 -0.415015 0.6793 
IB_SWE 1.601742 1.040624 1.539213 0.1280 
IB_HQ -0.288588 0.920428 -0.313537 0.7548 
IB_ALB -0.070152 0.971569 -0.072205 0.9426 
IB_MS -1.944393 1.651082 -1.177648 0.2427 
IB_OHM -1.726702 1.720166 -1.003800 0.3187 
IB_ARN -0.755969 1.047802 -0.721481 0.4729 
S_IND -0.926258 2.191934 -0.422576 0.6738 
S_CDI -0.517238 2.157841 -0.239702 0.8112 
S_CST -2.782994 3.055186 -0.910908 0.3653 
S_HLC -2.308144 2.238441 -1.031139 0.3058 
S_FIN -1.917553 2.302068 -0.832970 0.4075 
S_IT -0.669596 2.167676 -0.308900 0.7583 
FAGE 0.523096 0.251049 2.083643 0.0406 
M_ATC -0.510771 0.673970 -0.757854 0.4509 
M_TOS -0.667304 0.547585 -1.218630 0.2269 
M_RED 0.361352 0.671849 0.537847 0.5923 
M_ISL 0.165814 0.505828 0.327807 0.7440 
M_INC 0.230697 0.597381 0.386180 0.7005 
M_PUB 0.714821 0.479360 1.491199 0.1402 
P_FAM -1.865507 0.757918 -2.461357 0.0162 
P_ENT -1.282457 0.641662 -1.998649 0.0493 
P_VC -1.202367 0.590397 -2.036541 0.0453 
P_EMP -1.788825 1.362780 -1.312629 0.1934 
P_ASS -2.103937 1.380665 -1.523858 0.1318 
P_GOV 0.072253 1.563079 0.046225 0.9633 
OBT 0.238357 0.544382 0.437849 0.6628 
POP 0.015629 0.594910 0.026272 0.9791 
SIO -0.128531 0.635317 -0.202310 0.8402 
REV -0.474384 0.171856 -2.760354 0.0073 
C 3.874608 2.517482 1.539081 0.1280 
R-squared 0.325051     Mean dependent var 0.211810 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033182     S.D. dependent var 1.932134 
S.E. of regression 1.899808     Akaike info criterion 4.369441 
Sum squared resid 267.0859     Schwarz criterion 5.193771 
Log likelihood -200.7651     F-statistic 1.113687 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.064701     Prob(F-statistic) 0.344519 
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9.1.2 The Modified Regression Model 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FIRSTDAYRETURN 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/29/05   Time: 15:23 
Sample: 1 100 
Included observations: 100 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
IB_ENS -0.264870 0.166931 -1.586704 0.1173 
IB_CAR -0.128061 0.164715 -0.777472 0.4396 
IB_SHB 0.113194 0.173577 0.652125 0.5166 
IB_SWE 0.106595 0.224216 0.475415 0.6360 
IB_HQ -0.505660 0.195685 -2.584050 0.0120 
IB_ALB -0.432284 0.199330 -2.168684 0.0337 
IB_MS -0.290128 0.321401 -0.902698 0.3699 
IB_OHM 0.332156 0.343507 0.966955 0.3370 
IB_ARN -0.382807 0.206280 -1.855766 0.0679 
S_IND -0.273591 0.421684 -0.648805 0.5187 
S_CDI -0.423066 0.414728 -1.020106 0.3113 
S_CST 0.159036 0.601279 0.264496 0.7922 
S_HLC -0.006010 0.420048 -0.014308 0.9886 
S_FIN -0.083380 0.442599 -0.188388 0.8511 
S_IT -0.037228 0.417579 -0.089153 0.9292 
FAGE 0.070129 0.049700 1.411034 0.1629 
M_ATC -0.025632 0.130959 -0.195722 0.8454 
M_TOS -0.034008 0.108864 -0.312388 0.7557 
M_RED 0.114451 0.145764 0.785176 0.4351 
M_ISL 0.097341 0.099866 0.974710 0.3332 
M_INC -0.158584 0.125268 -1.265955 0.2099 
M_PUB 0.071521 0.095507 0.748858 0.4566 
P_FAM -0.153183 0.154433 -0.991907 0.3248 
P_ENT -0.139428 0.126986 -1.097977 0.2761 
P_VC -0.182550 0.117822 -1.549370 0.1260 
P_EMP 0.197302 0.270033 0.730658 0.4675 
P_ASS -0.530033 0.268644 -1.972993 0.0526 
P_GOV -0.073251 0.305132 -0.240063 0.8110 
OBT 0.134126 0.101419 1.322487 0.1905 
POP -0.154781 0.109697 -1.410982 0.1629 
SIO 0.154239 0.127124 1.213290 0.2293 
REV -0.002651 0.023120 -0.114642 0.9091 
C 0.165820 0.478166 0.346783 0.7298 
R-squared 0.440485     Mean dependent var -0.119815
Adjusted R-squared 0.173254     S.D. dependent var 0.400134 
S.E. of regression 0.363824     Akaike info criterion 1.075228 
Sum squared resid 8.868640     Schwarz criterion 1.934934 
Log likelihood -20.76142     F-statistic 1.648332 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.769685     Prob(F-statistic) 0.043356 
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9.1.3 The Boom-Bust Regression 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FIRSTDAYRETURN 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/29/05   Time: 16:06 
Sample(adjusted): 1 103 
Included observations: 103 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
FAGE 0.046474 0.049230 0.944019 0.3485 
IB_ALB -0.476938 0.202247 -2.358192 0.0212 
IB_ARN -0.407702 0.211059 -1.931694 0.0575 
IB_CAR -0.127498 0.169415 -0.752579 0.4543 
IB_ENS -0.276833 0.170298 -1.625577 0.1086 
IB_HQ -0.378437 0.186263 -2.031740 0.0460 
IB_MS -0.324477 0.327012 -0.992247 0.3245 
IB_OHM 0.313374 0.354240 0.884638 0.3794 
IB_SHB 0.098046 0.176543 0.555364 0.5804 
IB_SWE 0.073379 0.227715 0.322239 0.7482 
M_ATC -0.008334 0.128760 -0.064725 0.9486 
M_INC -0.188476 0.126494 -1.489996 0.1408 
M_ISL 0.065005 0.101571 0.639995 0.5243 
M_PUB 0.096041 0.096616 0.994044 0.3237 
M_RED 0.089232 0.134039 0.665721 0.5078 
M_TOS -0.076267 0.109466 -0.696722 0.4883 
OBT 0.093861 0.115077 0.815643 0.4175 
P_ASS -0.493428 0.273528 -1.803941 0.0756 
P_EMP 0.182357 0.274769 0.663673 0.5091 
P_ENT -0.131454 0.129341 -1.016337 0.3130 
P_FAM -0.212908 0.150815 -1.411716 0.1625 
P_GOV -0.110144 0.306847 -0.358952 0.7207 
P_VC -0.181540 0.121074 -1.499414 0.1383 
POP -0.087302 0.110225 -0.792034 0.4311 
REV 0.007415 0.023283 0.318474 0.7511 
S_CDI -0.496202 0.442367 -1.121696 0.2659 
S_CST 0.135325 0.614836 0.220099 0.8264 
S_FIN -0.181047 0.460215 -0.393396 0.6952 
S_HLC -0.078443 0.436984 -0.179510 0.8581 
S_IND -0.355629 0.439673 -0.808848 0.4214 
S_IT -0.151929 0.440279 -0.345074 0.7311 
BOOM_BUST -0.096297 0.110862 -0.868626 0.3881 
SIO 0.234374 0.113327 2.068122 0.0424 
C 0.306274 0.523114 0.585482 0.5601 
R-squared 0.408034     Mean dependent var -0.113460
Adjusted R-squared 0.124920     S.D. dependent var 0.396718 
S.E. of regression 0.371112     Akaike info criterion 1.114949 
Sum squared resid 9.502989     Schwarz criterion 1.984665 
Log likelihood -23.41985     F-statistic 1.441235 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.790156     Prob(F-statistic) 0.101412 
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9.4 Explaination of variables 
 
 
IB_ENS  = Enskilda 
IB_CAR  = Carnegie 
IB_SHB  = Svenska Handelsbanken 
IB_SWE  = Swedbank 
IB_HQ  = Hagströmer & Qviberg 
IB_ALB  = Alfred Berg 
IB_MS  = Morgan Stanley 
IB_OHM  = Öhmans 
IB_ARN  = Aros / Nordea 
IB_OVR  = Övriga (excluded due to dummy variable trap) 
 
S_IND  = Industrials 
S_CDI  = Consumer Discretionary 
S_CST  = Consumer Staples 
S_HLC  = Health Care 
S_FIN  = Financials 
S_IT  = Information Technology 
S_TEL  = Telecomm (excluded due to dummy variable 
trap) 
 
FAGE  = Firm Age (Logarithmic variable) 
 
M_ATC  = Access to Capital Market 
M_TOS  = Take-over financed through Seasoned Equity 
Offering 
M_RED  = Reduce Debt 
M_ISL  = Increase Share Liquidity 
M_INC  = Incentives 
M_PUB  = Publicity 
M_CON  = Control (excluded due to dummy variable trap) 
 
P_FAM  = Family 
P_ENT  = Entrepreneur  
P_VC  = Venture Capital 
P_EMP  = Employees 
P_ASS  = Associated 
P_GOV  = Government 
P_PUB  = Public Corporation (excluded due to dummy  
   variable trap) 
 
OBT  = Offer by Tendure 
FIX  = Fixed price Offer (excluded due to dummy 
variable trap) 
 
POP  = Positive Operating Profits 
NOP  = Neg. Op. Profits (excluded due to dummy  
   variable trap) 
 
SIO  = Shift in Ownership 
NIO  = No S. in Owner. (excluded due to dummy 
variable trap) 
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REV  = Revenue (Logarithmic value) 
 
C  = Regression Constant 
 
